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Main introduction
The encounters between econometricians and data are frustrating and ul-
timately unsatisfactory both because econometricians want too much from
the data and hence tend to be disappointed by the answers, and because the
data are incomplete and imperfect.
Zvi Griliches, Handbook of Econometrics
Population economics shows to be an important field in economics as
much work has been done on demographic issues over the last years. Several
reasons for the importance of the field can be stated. Typical subjects of
population economics such as fertility, health, distribution, labour partici-
pation etc. influence outcomes of other economics disciplines such as labour
economics, development economics, growth theory etc. The family, which is
one of the subjects of population economics, is the first place where popula-
tion outcomes are produced. With the availability of individual and house-
hold data sets, economists could investigate these indicators thoroughly and
gain valuable insights into the functioning and decision making of the basic
economic units - the families. The findings can be used in many related dis-
ciplines of economics as for example in development (see Deaton (1997) for
an overview) or labour economics (for example Gray (1998)).
The analysis of demographic phenomena has a long tradition. Malthus
(1798) started the ongoing discussion on demographics with his theory on
population growth. He postulates that innate population growth is very
fast and can only be stopped by shortages of subsistence goods; a theory,
which was since then changed, disputed and refuted. The fertility decisions
of households were exogenously given and not subject to analysis. Becker
(1964, 1981) introduced a new way of looking at family behaviour with his
idea that fertility of the household is endogenous and influenced by economic
and non-economic factors. Decisions of families could be analysed and were
based on economic reasoning.
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Studies on population economics focus either on a macroeconomic topic
like population growth - for example related to technical change and natural
resources as in the analysis of Robinson and Srinivasan (1997) or on micro-
economic topics like mortality, fertility, poverty or migration. I will focus
on some of the mentioned microeconomic topics and will analyse them more
thoroughly in the following papers that can be read independently of each
other.
The dissertation consists of three papers that deal with excess female
mortality, with migration decisions, and with nutrition and productivity. I
will now present a short overview of the three fields and my contributions.
Mortality and health are the most vital subjects of population economics
as life per se and health are typically seen as a positive asset without starting
any economic reasoning (Sen, 1998). Mortality has been investigated with
respect to diverse contexts. In the context of European or industrialised
countries, mortality in the early development and industrialisation attended
much attention. Fogel (1997) summarises the findings on the huge mortality
decline in the Western World since 1750.
Studies on mortality in developing countries of today focus mainly on
illness-related mortality and on mortality based on inequalities. Mortality
based on gender inequality in access to survival related goods is called excess
female mortality and is investigated thoroughly by Sen (1989) and Klasen
(1994, 1998, 1999) and Klasen and Wink (2002). Most of the papers inves-
tigate the concept of missing women: missing women are the women that
would be alive today additionally if no inequality in the access to resources of
the household existed. The excess female mortality can not only be detected
in today’s developing countries like India, Pakistan or China (Das Gupta and
Bhat (1997); Langford and Storey (1993); Coale and Banister (1994)), but
also in the early development of Europe, for example in Germany, England
or Ireland (McNay, Humphries, and Klasen (1998, 2002)). Ireland has to be
seen as a special case, because excess female mortality increased from the
1850s onwards while it began to decline in other European countries. This
exceptionally high excess female mortality persisted in some age groups even
until the mid twentieth century.
My first paper contains an analysis of Excess female mortality in Ireland
from 1871 to 1926, based on census data and vital statistics. The beginning
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of my observation period lies after the great Irish famine of 1845 to 1850 with
very high excess mortality, which had affected men more than women. Panel
regressions on excess female mortality show that the pattern of explanatory
factors is similar to the pattern found for example in England at the same
time, but with a higher stock of excess female mortality. I find that women’s
situation improves with a higher labour market participation. But, as work-
ing conditions were detrimental to health in early industrialisation, a higher
female participation in sectors such as the industrial sector ruins the gains
in power over family resources. Furthermore, the high emigration rates of
women and the high share of the agricultural sector hurt women.
Comparing Ireland to England and Wales, a much higher share of agri-
cultural employment can be observed. As agricultural employment increases
excess female mortality in both regions, higher Irish excess female mortality
can partly be explained. Further differences in explanatory variables that
help to explain the higher Irish excess female mortality are a high emigration
of women out of Ireland and a different effect of poor relief on women.
Migration is a further serious indicator that can alter the economic situ-
ation of the population of a country positively or negatively. Analyses can
be divided into the search for the determinants and the effects of migration
(Borjas, 1994). I will focus on ideas underlying the first one, because my
contribution will be on the determinants of internal migration in Germany.
Greenwood (1997) emphasises the importance of local unemployment on mi-
gration decisions which is mainly relevant in the U.S., but also in East-West
German migration, as will be shown in the paper. When looking at the ef-
fects of immigration, economists often face the problem that the causation
between the variables is not clear; so, they are looking eagerly for exoge-
nous and unexpected changes in the observed market because responses to
exogenous shocks can be identified. These occurrences are called “natural
experiments” and papers have been done for example on the effects of unex-
pected huge flows of migration or labour into a local labour market (Gould,
Lavy, and Paserman (2004) and Card (1990)).
An empirical analysis of who decides to migrate and if migrants are se-
lected randomly from the home population is seriously hampered by a lack
of individual data in the context of international migration. Household pan-
els in the home countries usually do not allow international emigrants to be
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identified - they simply disappear from the panel. Thus, although we have
rich information on immigrants in many host countries, the phenomenon of
self-selection cannot be addressed systematically on the basis of standard
data sources. German unification offers a unique opportunity to study the
problem of the selection of migrants. There exist several micro data sets that
allow East-West migrants to be identified before and after movement.
The second paper is concerned about the migration decision of East Ger-
man workers to move to West Germany. Cumulative net migration from
East to West Germany amounts to 1.3 million persons or 7.5 per cent of
the original population in East Germany over the period from 1989 until
the end of 2001. Since the inequality of earnings in East Germany has ap-
proached West German levels in the late 1990s, the standard Roy model pre-
dicts that a positive selection bias of East-West migrants should disappear.
Using a switching regression model and data from the IAB-employment sam-
ple, which is a one per cent sample of individuals who are registered by the
German social security system, we find that employed East-West migrants re-
main positively self-selected with respect to unobserved abilities. This result
is consistent with the predictions of an extended Roy model, which considers
moving costs that are negatively correlated with labour market abilities of
individuals. Moreover, we find that wage differentials as well as differences
in employment opportunities are the central forces which drive East-West
migration after unification.
Poverty and hunger are outstanding problems of population economics re-
lated to developing countries. Empirical studies on the determinants of these
factors are necessary to find remedies against them. Economists have shown
theoretically that better nutrition increases productivity and that there is
a threshold of the nutritional status below which people are not able to
produce the equivalent to their subsistence wages. The theory of nutritional
efficiency wages has been modeled by several authors, for example by Leiben-
stein (1957) and Bliss and Stern (1978). The corresponding dynamic concept
of poverty traps was developed by Dasgupta (1997). Theory implies that help
for the poorest of the population has to improve their nutritional status di-
rectly (for example through (re)distribution of land or food) to enable them
to work.
Empirical investigations exploring the issue at hand explain the influence
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of nutrition and health on income. Behrmann and Deolalikar (1989) and
Strauss and Thomas (1995) have written comprehensive surveys on the ex-
isting studies on nutritional efficiency wages and they find that studies on
the influence of BMI on wages indicate that there is a positive relationship
while studies which investigate the influence of wages on BMI indicate that
there is more or less no influence.
The last paper of my dissertation explains the reasons why individuals
stay in poverty. I am looking into the empirical relationship between nutri-
tion (Body Mass Index) and wages using the Côte d’Ivoire Living Standards
Survey (CILSS) from 1985 to 88. I find that non-labour income of the in-
dividual positively influences not only the probability to be in employment,
but also the amount of wages the individual will get. Non-labour income
further influences wages indirectly by increasing the nutritional status of the
workers. With a higher BMI, workers are able to work more productively
and generate a higher wage. I conclude that a policy to help individuals out
of a poverty trap should increase the non-labour income of individuals.
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Gender Bias in mortality in Ireland
around 1900
Abstract
Excess female mortality in Ireland rose after the famine of the
late 1840’s while it began to normalise in other European countries.
This exceptionally high excess female mortality persisted in some age
groups even until the mid twentieth century. In my paper, I show the
historical background that could have led to such a special pattern,
explain excess female mortality theoretically and try to find an ex-
planation for the excess female mortality using panel regressions with
county data from the Irish censuses from 1871 to 1926.
Using panel regression to explain excess female mortality, I find
that the pattern of explanatory factors is similar to the pattern found
for example in England at the same time. I find that women’s situation
improves with a higher labour market participation. But, as working
conditions are detrimental to health during the observed period, a
higher female participation in sectors such as the industrial sector
ruins the gains in power over family resources. Furthermore, the high
emigration rates of women and the high share of the agricultural sector
hurt women.
Comparing Ireland to England and Wales, a much higher share
of agricultural employment can be observed. As agricultural employ-
ment increases excess female mortality in both regions, higher Irish
outcomes can be partly explained. Further differences in explanatory
variables that help to explain the higher Irish excess female mortality
are a high emigration out of Ireland and a different effect of poor relief
on women.
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1 Introduction
Gender inequality is pervasive in today’s developing countries with severe
consequences for well-being and economic development. The inequality can
be related to access to resources, education, health care or any other good.
Gender inequality reduces the productivity of farms and firms, because low
labour market participation of women leads to inefficiencies in the allocation
of factors of production. Lower labour market participation and education of
women reduces overall output and hurts, finally, the economic development
of countries. The most severe effect of gender inequality shows up when
looking at the costs that are imposed on the people directly affected. Gender
inequality means a lower health status and quality of life for them and in the
end a higher mortality rate and a lower life expectation (World Bank, 2001).
But not only the economic effect of premature mortality should be taken
into consideration. Living per se is valued as a positive good and thus is
striven for to be as long as possible (Sen, 1998).
Sen (1989), Klasen (1994) and Klasen and Wink (2002) find that if there
was no inequality between the sexes, a much higher number of women would
be alive today. They calculate around 90 million “missing women”, missing
because of their reduced access to survival-related goods in the household.
In the line of the concept of “missing women”, studies on the most affected
countries of today exist, for example for India (Coale, 1991; Das Gupta and
Bhat, 1997), Sri Lanka (Langford and Storey, 1993) and China (Coale and
Banister, 1994) or for Northern Africa (Tabutin, 1992).
In a historical European context, Ireland stands out as a country with
a particularly large disadvantage in mortality for women from late 19th to
mid 20th century (Coleman, 1992; Klasen, 1999). But other countries also
suffered from excess female mortality, for example Klasen (1998) shows that
excess female mortality was high among adults in Germany from 1740 to
1860. Humphries (1991), McNay, Humphries, and Klasen (2002) and Mc-
Nay, Humphries, and Klasen (1998) investigate the excess mortality rates of
England and Wales in the 19th century, which exist not only in the adult
women group, but also among adolescents.
After having suitably defined mortality disadvantage, the measure should
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indicate female excess mortality arising due to gender inequities in the access
to resources (health care, clean water, clear air, food).
Two main hypotheses can be extracted from earlier investigations on ex-
cess female mortality. Agricultural change hurts women more than men,
because women in ante-industrial societies are mainly employed in agricul-
ture; when agriculture becomes more mechanised, many women lose their
jobs (e.g. Boserup (1970), Johansson (1991)). With upcoming industriali-
sation, new job opportunities arise. But besides the problem that men are
preferred in industry jobs, because they are stronger, working conditions in
early industrialisation are hard and safety guidelines do not exist, so the em-
ployment that helps women in financing their own life also hurts them. It
is not clear whether the positive effect of new employment in the industry
sector exceeds the negative effect of harmful work conditions.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In the next chapter, I define
excess female mortality, chapter 3 then presents theories on explaining ex-
cess female mortality in child and adult ages and comes out with testable
hypotheses. After the description of the data and the econometric framework
in Section 4, I present the mortality and explanatory variables in chapters 5,
6 and 7. Finally, chapter 8 shows the regression results from explaining excess
female mortality and in chapter 9, I draw conclusions from my results.
2 Definition of Excess female mortality
The problem is that it is not clear whether the higher female mortality rates
exist despite or because of equity between the sexes. One can only detect
times when there were high mortality rates compared to the other time pe-
riods. Kennedy (1973) has found a high excess female mortality based on
comparisons with England and the U.S.
The definition of excess female mortality is based on an assumption of how
large the female relative to male mortality rates should be. Klasen (1999)
argues that we cannot use a benchmark of a society with complete equity
between the sexes because it does not exist. Furthermore, mortality rates can
differ for reasons different from resource allocation. Today, female mortality
is relatively low amongst others because of the higher cigarette and alcohol
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consume of males. Because I am interested in excess female mortality that
arises because of inequities in allocation, I have to normalise the mortality
rates.
When we want to compare mortality rates directly, we should standard-
ise the mortality rates to make them comparable. We can standardise the
rates with different methods. McNay, Humphries, and Klasen (1998) use the
diagonal regression method of Preston (1976) to standardise English mortal-
ity rates. The method calculates the expected mortality rates by regressing
male on female mortality. The regression line is then taken as the expected
mortality rate and a positive deviation of the observed female mortality from
the line is then defined as excessive.
Another way to standardise mortality rates is to take model life tables.
The life tables I use to normalise the mortality rates were developed by Coale,
Demeny, and Vaughan (1983). They are based on different, mainly European,
regions in the late 19th and early 20th century. The tables are based on the
mortality rates and life expectancies, showing the highest mortality rates in
the South and the West regions and the lowest in the North. As the West
tables are based mainly on England, we use these as a benchmark for the Irish
mortality rates. We can then see if Irish excess female mortality is higher
than the standard in this region and to this time. The reasons to choose
the second approach is that the normalisation to the surrounding region is a
reasonable indicator for the speciality of Irish mortality rates.
I normalise the actual mortality rates using the following equation:
efm =
fma/mma
fmn/mmn
, (1)
where efm = excess female mortality, fm = female mortality, mm=male
mortality, the subscript a refers to the actual and n to the normal value.
3 Theories of excess female mortality
Since excess female mortality is understood as an outcome of inequalities
between the sexes, theories explaining excess female mortality look into the
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families as the first place to find inequalities in the allocation of survival-
related goods. As I will explain both excess female mortality of children and
of adults, I will divide the theoretical considerations into explanations for
girls’ and women’s excess mortality.
The first model explaining female mortality was developed by Becker
(1964, 1981). The household was by then seen as an entity and an increase
in household income increased welfare of all members in the same way. As
the basic model is not able to explain inequalities in the allocation of goods,
new models have been developed. They are based on bargaining models and
the basic idea is that the allocation of goods in the households is subject to
bargaining among the family members and the relative power of the members.
Bargaining models can be cooperative or non-cooperative.
Child mortality can be explained by different theories. First of all, bar-
gaining models used for the allocation of goods among adults can be enlarged
to include children so that they also have to play a role in the bargaining
process. Another method is to look at children as an investment of the par-
ents in the future, for example to assure their old age pension. The last
possibility is that there are non-economic reasons to prefer one gender out of
cultural tradition.
3.1 Adults: bargaining models
Distribution between men and women is normally addressed in the framework
of bargaining models of marriage or models of distribution within the family
in general. The first model of the household was developed by Becker and
can be called the common preference model (Becker, 1964, 1981). In Becker’s
model, an effective altruist maximises utility of all members of the household
through the allocation of resources. Female mortality depends in this model
only on changes in overall changes in resource availability, because resources
are always divided equally over the family, independently on who gains most.
The empirically more successful models are the bargaining or collective
models (McElroy and Horney, 1981; Klasen, 1998). The important concept
in bargaining models is the threat point which plays a decisive role for the
intra-household resource allocation. Specialisation of labour and public goods
related to the household bring gains of marriage, but the share of resources
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that each household member gets is subject to a bargaining process. The
strength of the partner is influenced by outside option of both partners. The
outside option is determined by the earnings opportunities of both partners,
the relative position in the marriage or remarriage market and other indica-
tors that could affect the well-being of both partners after divorce. Mortality
of women in this model depends not only on the overall income as in the
case of Becker’s model, but more on her own income. With a higher income
she reaches a better bargaining position and can claim a higher share of re-
sources. Even if the two models differ considerably, the model of Becker can
be regarded as a special case of bargaining models (see Thomas (1990)).
Sen (1990) introduces the concepts of perceived interest and perceived
contribution into the bargaining model. Perceived interests of the partners
can influence the resource allocation in the household. As women may be
more altruistic to children than men, they share their resources with the
children and end up in a weaker position. Also, the contributions to the
household can be perceived differently by the household members. Household
work may be valued less by the husband who contributes his gained wages to
the household, so that he claims a large part of the common resources. The
allocation of the resources depends now not only on the breakdown position,
but also on factors that influence life in the family. Mortality of women does
not decrease automatically in this model when she earns more money if her
perceived interests lie in the welfare of her children.
In all three models, the state can influence gender bias in mortality by
providing survival related goods to individuals or households. When the
endowment with survival related resources increases, the amount of resources
per household member increases, even if not in the same way as proposed in
the last two models.
A macroeconomic view on the change in excess female mortality could
be provided by using the Kuznets relationship between development and
inequality (Kuznets, 1955), which says that as countries develop, inequality
first worsens and then improves again. Used for inequality between genders,
the theory tells that women’s economic role is weakened in early development
(they are losing bargaining power) and is strengthened later on. In the huge
agricultural change in Ireland that took place in the time of my analysis,
women lost their income possibilities and with them their bargaining power.
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In industry, the many female outworkers were in very unhealthy environments
and died early from tuberculosis or other illnesses. And finally men possess
more strength so they were more likely to be hired in industry than women.
The theories provide several testable hypotheses on the power of women
in the household even in the case when only macro data are available. While
the theoretical household models at hand try to explain what factors drive
the allocation of resources between the sexes, I will explain the county-wide
mortality rate. The mortality rate could be defined as a kind of relative
female health status and thus as an outcome of the distribution of resources
in families. The explanatory variables in the household models are proxied
with aggregate county variables.
One hypothesis is that with a higher amount of spinsters of marriageable
age, divorce can less be used as a threat to the husband in case of non-
cooperation, because a wide remarriage market is available to the men. The
special case of Ireland takes some power of this hypothesis, because divorce is
especially hurting women because of the strictly catholic population in most
of the counties.
A further hypothesis is related to the power in the family due to resources
brought into the household. Horney and McElroy (1988) argue that earned
incomes may not be a good indicator for the bargaining power of a partner,
because earnings are a part of the strategy of the household to maximise
utility. The better measure may be non-labour income as inheritances or
property of one partner, but that cannot be used in a macro model. Thus,
we use labour market participation of men and women and suggest that the
higher the labour market participation of women, the higher their power in
the struggle over shared resources should be and so, their mortality should
be lower. Even if the non-participation of women is part of the utility max-
imisation of the family, women are weakened in their position because their
outside option is not part of the maximisation calculus.
The hypothesis based on the Kuznets relationship reads that variables
measuring agricultural change should influence excess female mortality neg-
atively.
20
3.2 Children as investment goods
For the explanation of how resources are allocated to and among children,
three different theories can be applied. First, the bargaining models that
are used to determine the allocation decisions among adults can be enlarged
to be valid also for children. When we apply bargaining models to whole
families, children will also have to bargain for their resources. As the adult
family members decide on the allocation of goods in the normal case, chil-
dren do have a weak standing in the bargaining process. Between parents and
children, Sen’s concept of perceived interest can be used to explain the allo-
cation decisions (Sen, 1990): With a rising position of the mothers, children
are better off in the allocation process because of the altruistic behaviour
of mothers. If women have a tendency to prefer daughters, then a better
position of women helps to lower excess female mortality in child ages.
Behrmann (1998) develops a model where children’s expected income goes
into the utility of the family and thus children take part in the distribution of
goods with their future value. That model can be subsumed under the second
strand of literature on explaining resource allocation to children: Children are
seen as investment goods and thus the costs and gains of children are taken
into account by parents. Having a child induces cost for raising, feeding,
education etc. The gains can consist of different factors, but the background
is always that children are born to transfer resources, i. e. child labour services
or care for aged parents. Several reasons can exist to diminish the gains
from daughters. In most regions and times it has been found that boys do
have higher chances of finding paid work than girls so the maintenance of the
family can be guaranteed more easily with a son. In regions where girls settle
with their husband’s family upon marriage and care for his family, there is
little incentive to sustain daughters after this. The tradition of giving big
dowries is also a hindrance to the well-being of girls.
Hill and King (1993) model the decision of parents to educate their chil-
dren, again using a utility function with the expected incomes of the children
as one factor. Expected income is dependent on the education, the alterna-
tive is sending the children to work. Without defining preferences or tastes
of parents, the model can explain e.g. with a lower return of schooling for
girls, why rational parents discriminate against girls.
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When the two theories above - the bargaining model or the investment
model - cannot be applied, there can still be a non-economic reason that
parents discriminate against girls. The non-economic values of boys could
exceed that of girls because of tradition or because (for example) a son would
maintain the family name or special rites (Schultz, 1997).
4 Econometric Framework and Used Data
Theory provides a framework for testing excess female mortality. I will ex-
plain the excess female mortality rates in two age groups, 10 to 19 and 25
to 44 with the explanatories coming from theory and earlier empirical inves-
tigations. I included for example emigration because of the especially high
emigration rates out of Ireland during the observed period. The model will
be as follows:
EFMit = f(Overall Mortalityit, Economic Structureit,
Female Employmentit, Living conditionsit,
remarriage marketit, emigrationit,
agricultural changeit, educationit, birthsit) (2)
where the subscripts i and t refer to county and year. The explanatory
variables are grouped into the above categories and will be defined in Section
7.
The time period of my investigation is 1871 to 1926, with observations
for 1871, 1881, 1891, 1901 and 1926. These are the years when a census
was conducted by the Irish government. There exists another census of 1911
which I decided not to use. As Budd and Guinnane (1991) document with
the help of a linked census sample containing the censuses of 1901 and 1911,
the introduction of an old age pension system in 1908 led the people to lie
about their ages. To give an earlier birth date could help to receive a pension;
this was possible because exact birth dates were only registered from 1864.
Budd and Guinnane (1991) find in their estimation results that people from
the age of 30 onward would exaggerate their ages, with women exaggerating
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more than men. We decided not to use this census year, because there is
also the possibility to use the 1926 census that had been undertaken shortly
after the separation of North and South Ireland and is still comparable. The
observed period is situated after the Irish famine of 1845 to 1850 and ends
when Ireland becomes independent. Thus, it does not include the time when
the female mortality reached a normal level in the mid twentieth century.
Mortality data of Ireland are published on county level in the Annual
Reports on Vital Statistics (Registrar General for Ireland, several years).
The data exist on a yearly basis, but we have only taken the census years,
because only then explanatory variables are available.
The data set contains observations for the 26 Irish counties and for Ulster.
I could not use the counties of Ulster separately because the division of the
cities over the counties changed over time, so proper population numbers and
numbers of deaths could not be derived. For the 26 counties, we observe 5
years, for Ulster only 4 (with 1926 missing).
5 Excess Female Mortality in Ireland
The starting point of my investigation lies after the time of the Irish Famine
of 1845-1850. In famines, mortality rates of women are observed to be lower
than that of men (Dreze and Sen, 1989, p. 55), and it is argued that this
happens because of biological reasons. Also in Ireland, women had a lower
death ratio than men during the famine (O Grada, 1993, p.180).
Calculating excess female mortality in a sensible way involves the normal-
isation of mortality rates with respect to the life tables. Life table mortality
rates are calculated for different life expectancies of females and the respec-
tive expectancies of males. I use the male life expectancy as the normal,
unbiased case and take the respective male and female mortality rates. I
could have taken the female life expectancy as the unbiased case, but as we
are concerned about an abnormally high female mortality, I prefer the first
variant.
Life expectancy of women in Ireland is low relative to men and relative
to the European standard at this time. The life expectancy both for women
and men increases from the middle of the nineteenth century to the middle
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of the twentieth like in other European countries.
Figure 1 shows that it is only in around 1900 that life expectancy rises
at all; it shows, too, that it is only in the 1930’s that women gain in life
expectancy over men. This phenomenon happened much earlier in other
European countries. Taking the male life expectancy as the norm, life table
female life expectancy is included in the Figure and lies some five years higher
than the actual female expectancy. From the 1930’s onwards, life expectancy
is further split into urban and rural with a 5 year higher expectancy of urban
females than males. Rural life expectancies are not shown, but are higher
than the urban. This is possible due to the bad housing conditions and the
hard work in industry in the urban areas.
Still at the end of the seventies, Walsh and Walsh (1978) discuss the
relative low female life expectancy in Ireland compared to other European
countries. They argue that the normalisation of the female life expectancy
went hand in hand with economic upturn so that only the economic situation
caused the relatively high female mortality, while inequality between the
sexes is not needed as an argument for the explanation of the life expectancy
differences. But with this argument, the question remains why the Irish men
are less hurt by the economic situation than women.
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Figure 1: Life expectancy in Ireland and life tables
Having found a low life expectancy of women relative to men, I now turn
to the age specific excess female mortality rates. To see if they are also high
relative to the life table rates or internationally, I will compare them with
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Table 1: Life table and Irish mortality
Age Life table West Mortality rates Ireland Norm
group m(x)f m(x)m
fmn
mmn
m(x)f m(x)m
fma
mma
EFM
10 to14 2.88 2.67 1.08 3.35 2.54 1.32 1.22
15 to 19 4.09 3.99 1.03 5.12 4.33 1.18 1.15
20 to 24 5.32 5.69 0.93 6.06 6.77 0.90 0.96
10 to 19 3.48 3.32 1.05 4.22 3.4 1.24 1.19
25 to 44 7.28 8.07 0.90 8.33 8.12 1.03 1.14
Life table mortality Level 14 is valid for 1871 to 1901 (1926 is Level 16)
Irish mortality rates are averages over all available years 1871 to 1926
both.
Table 1 shows the life table mortality rates and the mortality rates of
Ireland and in the last row the excess female mortality in Ireland. We look
at different age groups, from 10 to 14 and 15 to 19 as the age groups of
adolescents, and 20 to 24 and 25 to 44 as the age groups of adults. Mortality
rates of men and women are higher than the life table mortality rates; only
boys aged 10 to 14 have a lower mortality than the life tables would predict.
The ratios between female and male mortality are nevertheless higher for the
Irish rates than for the life table, with again one exception, in the age group
20 to 24.
The highest excess female mortality exists in the age group 10 to 14, while
in the age group 20 to 24 even one value indicating excess male mortality
can be observed. The other values lie in between.
Figures 2 and 3 present international excess female mortality for the age
groups 5 to 10 and 20 to 25, provided by Klasen and used in Klasen (1999).
The excess female mortality rates stem from Ireland, Sweden, UK and Italy
and refer to the nearest date to the date on the axis.
Excess female mortality in Ireland is internationally the highest in the
5 to 10 age group over all years except in 1850 which was the end of the
famine. During the famine, women were relatively well off possibly because
of biological reasons. In all years, Ireland shows an excess female mortality
that means the ratio is bigger than one.
In the 20 to 25 age group, Ireland shows an excess female mortality below
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one between 1870 and 1900. Other countries showed higher values during this
period. Up to 1850 and from 1910 onwards, Ireland shows, as expected, the
highest excess female mortality among the countries.
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Figure 2: International normalised excess female mortality age 5 to 10
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Figure 3: International normalised excess female mortality age 20 to 25
In the following, mortality rates over time and space in Ireland are pre-
sented. Figure 4 shows the age specific mortality rates of females as a per-
centage of males in Ireland from 1864 to 1967. The development of female
relative to male mortality shows quite high differences looking at different
regions, age groups and times. It is only in the 1940’s that most of the age
specific mortality rates decline rapidly, but some already decline from the
beginning of the 19th century. Relatively high female mortality can mainly
26
be observed in the age groups from 5 to 24, not showing higher mortality
of males until the 1950’s. These values are not normalised, but as Table 1
shows, excess female mortality is expected to be high, too. Without normal-
isation, we nevertheless suspect disadvantages for women in certain periods
when looking at the significant differences in mortality rates over time.
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Figure 4: Mortality rates Ireland (Kennedy, 1973)
Figures 5 and 6 show the excess mortality rates for the age groups 10 to 19
and 25 to 44 on province level. The mortality rates of these age groups, but
on county level, are explained in a multivariate model in the remainder of the
paper. Excess female mortality in the two presented age groups is increasing
in most provinces over the observed time span. The highest increase occurs
in Connaught in both age groups while in Leinster the ratios do not increase
(in the age group 25 to 44), or only slightly.
On county level, the following maps (Figure 7 and 8) show the develop-
ment of the age groups 10 to 19 and 25 to 44 for the counties in the first year
and the last two years (1871, 1901 and 1926). The two age groups stand for
girls and adult women. The darker the counties are shaded, the higher the
relative female mortality in the presented age groups is.
There exist two statistics to test the null hypothesis of no spatial auto-
correlation, assuming that x is normally distributed. Both tests for spatial
autocorrelation, Moran’s I and Geary’s c, show for all years and age groups
that the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation cannot be rejected. The ag-
glomeration areas of Ireland Dublin and Belfast show a relatively positive
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Figure 5: Excess female mortality rates age 10 to 19
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Figure 6: Excess female mortality rates age 25 to 44
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picture for women, while there is no consistent picture regarding the worst
areas. It seems that high excess female mortality is not directly related to
the backwardness of the area. We also cannot see a pattern like a west-east
division that is sometimes postulated because of the backwardness of the
west (Kennedy, 1973).
One cause for the high female mortality rates could be that women had
to work very hard. But hard work cannot be the only cause for the mortality
differences, because we have observed the highest excess mortality rates in
child ages. An extensive analysis of the causes in a multivariate model has
not been carried out to my knowledge.
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6 Mortality from Tuberculosis
Tuberculosis was a serious problem in Ireland during the surveyed period.
Even if it does not explain mortality rates, it is an interesting part of mor-
tality that is worth looking at. I assume that excess female mortality from
TB is influenced by the same factors as excess female mortality overall. This
assumption is reasonable because we will see that mortality from TB and
overall mortality are highly correlated.
The Tuberculosis epidemic was rising in the 1880’s and 1890’s and cul-
minated in 1904. It had started after years of relative health in the 1860’s
and 1870’s when the mortality from tuberculosis had even been lower in Ire-
land than in England, Wales and Scotland (Jones, 2001). The high mortality
rates were falling very slowly in the following decades and in the 1940’s they
were still higher than in many European countries. The normalisation of the
overall mortality rates coincides with the normalisation of tuberculosis.
Mostly youth and young adults were infected by tuberculosis (Jones,
2001). During puberty mostly females died of TB, in older age groups the
death rates of TB were more equal between genders. It was more probable
for poor people to have TB and urbanisation brought a higher TB rate, men
being more affected.
Tuberculosis was regarded as a hereditary disease, so that the infection
of children of marriageable age was often not admitted to increase the prob-
ability of marriage. Thus, an underenumeration of TB deaths in these age
categories occurs. Jones (2001) reports that for example in Dublin, previous
to 1879, 10% of the dead were not registered, but showed up in the returns
of burials. It often occurred that deaths from TB were related to a harmless
death cause as for instance bronchitis.
At that time, several explanations spread for the high mortality of tu-
berculosis. One was that the celtic race was specially prone to an infection
with TB. This theory was contradicted by the fact that in the most celtic
part of Ireland, in the West, TB was least spread. The effects of emigration
were controversially discussed. One argument was that the soundest were re-
moved from Ireland and thus mortality (overall and from Tuberculosis) was
especially high in the remaining population (Jones, 2001).
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Figure 9: Death rates from tuberculosis by sex in Ireland and in England and
Wales in the early twentieth century (Guinnane, 1997, Figure 4.1, p. 115)
The true reasons for the high mortality from tuberculosis and the par-
ticular susceptibility of women may have been the same as for excess female
mortality: poverty, urbanisation and malnutrition. In 1871 50% of the female
workers in the Linen factories of Belfast were aged between 15 and 25 years
and hard work and unhealthy environment led to higher mortality rates.
Many of them worked at home; the bad housing conditions in urban areas
made it easy for the bacillus to spread over the women and their daughters,
staying with their mothers while men and their sons worked in the fields. The
women who were weakened from the bad living conditions and malnutrition
contracted tuberculosis that their body otherwise may have resisted.
In the age groups 10-14 and 15-19, one can see from figure 9 that Irish
female mortality from Tuberculosis exceeded mortality in other countries. In
the case of 15 to 19 year old girls the percentage difference to the males was
even double the mortality in England.
Figures 10 to 12 show the extent of TB mortality relative to overall mor-
tality. Figure 10 shows that the share of TB deaths on all deaths was around
12 % for females and 11% for males in 1871. In 1926, it was still 10% for
both genders, there was almost no change.
33
Figure 11 demonstrates the share of TB deaths on all deaths in age groups
for 1871. The highest difference between males and females is in the age group
10 to 14, while the highest shares are in the ages 15 to 24 with a higher share
for women than men.
Finally, the regional pattern in 1881 is shown in Figure 12. With four
percentage points difference, Ulster shows the highest shares of TB deaths
on all deaths (14 and 18 percent for men and women) and also the highest
difference in genders. Possibly, this result is due to the high industrialisation
in Belfast.
The correlation coefficients between TB mortality and overall mortality
amounts to 0.98, 0.90 and 0.94 for the three graphs, so it can be argued that
TB mortality is driven by the same factors than mortality from all causes.
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Figure 10: Death rates from TB rel. to all deaths in Ireland over time
We have seen that Tuberculosis led to a high number of deaths in teenage
age which is the age of the highest excess female mortality in Ireland. Un-
derreporting of deaths is a general problem, but if the percentage of under-
reporting is equal between the sexes, relative female mortality should not be
biased. Furthermore, underreporting of deaths from Tuberculosis seemed to
be more related to higher death numbers of other diseases like bronchitis.
Jones (2001) does not suspect that there existed a difference in reporting
deaths of women and men. If there was slight underreporting in deaths of
any gender, it would be female mortality that is higher in reality, so that
excess female mortality would also be higher.
To test if relative female mortality from Tuberculosis depends on the same
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in 1871
0.0000
0.0200
0.0400
0.0600
0.0800
0.1000
0.1200
0.1400
0.1600
0.1800
0.2000
Ireland Connaught Leinster Munster Ulster
female
male
Figure 12: Death rates from TB rel. to all deaths by Province in Ireland in
1881
35
sources as relative female mortality as a whole, mortality from Tuberculosis
could be introduced as an alternative dependent variable. But, as TB deaths
are aggregated on a much higher level, I do not have enough observations to
introduce it into a regression. As could be seen from the correlations between
TB mortality and mortality from all causes, the results would show the same
picture, only the scale would be different. I will assume in the remainder of
the paper that there is no underreporting of female TB deaths relative to
males.
7 Explaining relative female mortality
In the descriptive chapter it became clear that Irish relative female mortality
was not only high in international comparison, but also showed differences
across the regions. I will present several indicators which influence the female
mortality rate in theory or in other empirical applications and which could
serve as an explanation for the differences among counties. In the next
chapter, I will then test which of the possible explanations show up to have
a significant influence in a panel regression on excess female mortality in
different age groups.
Table 4 shows an overview of the presented variables pooled over all
counties and years while in the description of the variables, I aggregate over
provinces and show the trends over time.
7.1 Overall mortality
Surveys about 19th century England show that women are relatively well off
in terms of mortality when the general mortality is high (e.g. Woods (2000)
or McNay, Humphries, and Klasen (2002)). An extreme example of a high
mortality period is a famine and as mentioned before, female mortality in
the Irish famine was relatively low with respect to male mortality. After the
famine, overall mortality decreased, but relative female mortality was rising.
When we shall later include overall mortality in the regression, we accordingly
expect a negative influence on the excess female mortality. Figure 13 shows
the overall mortality rates in provinces over time.
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Figure 13: Overall mortality rate (based on census data; own calculation)
7.2 Economic structure
We expect that the labour market structure influences mortality of females
relative to males. High participation in the labour market in general shows a
well developing economy; many people earn wages and the standard of living
is generally higher.
The Irish Census data split up the number of workers into five working
categories. The professional class includes general or local government, de-
fence, professional occupations (for example teachers, students, or members
of religious communities). The domestic class includes all domestic offices or
services. The commercial class includes commercial occupations, conveyance
of men, goods and messages (for example merchants, commercial clerks and
coach makers). The agricultural class includes agriculture and animals (as for
example farmers, graziers, agricultural labourers and farm servants). The in-
dustrial class includes persons working and dealing in books, prints and maps,
machines and implements, houses, furniture and decorations, carriages and
harness, ships and boats, chemicals and compounds, tobacco and pipes, food
and lodgings, etc. (for example lodging house owners, cabinetmakers, millers,
greengrocers, dressmakers, tailors, shopkeepers). The last category, the in-
definite and non-productive class, includes persons not producing (vagrants,
schoolchildren, wives).
I aggregate the commercial and professional sectors into one sector, be-
cause neither involves physically hard work like in agriculture or industry.
Leinster, with Dublin, shows the highest percentage of workers in the profes-
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sional sector, while in Connaught and Ulster (ROI), the two most backward
areas, the least people work in the professional sector (see figure 17).
The agricultural sector shows the opposite picture to the professional
sector (see Figure 18). Now, Leinster is among the provinces with the lowest
share of agricultural workers (together with Ulster which is with Dublin one
of the agglomeration and industry areas) while Connaught and Ulster (ROI)
are the leading agricultural provinces. This pattern persists over the whole
observation period and gets even more pronounced at the end of the period.
The percentage of people not working increased until 1901 and remained
stable after that. Luddy (1999) tells that the Irish commissioners were told
to transfer more and more women over time into the nonproductive sector
even if they worked in the domestic sector or in agriculture. The increase in
the non-working population shows possibly only the changes in the method
of collecting the census data, not a real change in the working behaviour.
7.3 Female employment
According to theory, participation of women in the labour market strengthens
the women’s position in the family, so that the mortality of girls and women
relative to men and boys ought to fall with a higher employment rate of
women. Women gain more power by receiving wages and are better able to
get their share from the family resources. This should help them to reduce
their probability of dying. Moreover, according to the theory, it should be
expected that a strengthened position of the woman in the family also raises
the status of the girls, as wage-gaining mothers are generally better able to
support their children and especially their daughters.
Figure 20 shows the labour market participation of women relative to
men. I argued before that the overall labour market participation went
down because the Irish commissioners counted more and more women as
non-productive even if they worked in the family business (Luddy, 1999).
The full extent of this argument is displayed in Figure 20, showing that the
number of women relative to men working diminishes dramatically over the
observed period. I will account for the downturn in female employment with
an interaction term between female employment in domestic services and
the year 1871, because in this sector, the downturn is observed to be highest
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among all sectors.
The first assumption, that the status of a working woman will be raised,
can be expected, as it was usual in Ireland that men disposed of their wages
absolutely freely and did not even tell their wives how much they earned.
After having absolved the necessary investments for the farm or business
(and frequenting the pub), the wife got the left-overs to provide for the family.
With an own income of women, the provision for the family is expected to
ameliorate, according to theory.
As many of the jobs available for women in the surveyed period were very
unhealthy, the positive effect of the strengthened position in the family will
not necessarily suffice to reduce the mortality risk. Accordingly, we might
even observe a negative effect of female labour participation depending on
the observed sector. Fahey (2003) suggests in his descriptive investigation
that domestic servants will have a lower mortality, because they have better
housing possibilities than others.
From 1800 to 1918 women worked mostly in agriculture, domestic service
and the textile industry. Already before the famine many women worked
in the textile industry, which was one of the main employers of women at
the beginning of the 20th century. Industrialisation took place mostly in the
North East of the country and in a reduced way in the towns of Dublin, Cork,
Waterford and Limerick. For the rest, Ireland was an agricultural state. To-
wards the end of the 19th century chances for women in agriculture worsened
considerably. The whole agricultural system shifted from tillage to dairying,
there was more stock rearing and at the same time more mechanisation. All
this led to a lesser work intensity of the production and a lesser demand for
a female work force. The extent of the shift in agriculture is shown in the
next chapter.
The second assumption, that the situation of girls ameliorates when their
mothers work, cannot necessarily be applied to Irish circumstances. As there
were very many out-workers in the early industrialisation in Ireland and these
jobs were mostly occupied by women, the girls had to stay at home together
with their mothers. The bad housing conditions may have led to a higher
mortality (see chapter 6 about Tuberculosis). Moreover it was normal in Irish
families that men and sons had the privilege to eat first, and that privilege
would not change with the standing of the mothers, because it was seen as a
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tradition (Luddy, 1999).
7.4 Living conditions
Living conditions are proxied by three variables: population density, the
share of women in workhouses and the share of families living in fourth class
housing. The last two indicate the poverty of the families and women, the
first is an indicator for urbanity of the neighbourhood.
Figure 30 shows the population density in Irish areas, which is an in-
dicator for backward areas. Fahey (2003) reports that women died earlier,
especially in rural regions. In 1926, the census shows the mortality difference
by comparing mortality in the province of Connaught with the four main
cities. Female life disadvantage at birth in Connaught amounts to 1.7 years
while in the main cities, women had an advantage in life expectancy of 3.1
years at birth.
The relation of women to men in workhouses is shown in Figure 28. The
Irish poor law legislation of 1838 was an adaption of the poor law of England
and Wales of 1834 and brought a workhouse system for the very poor to
Ireland. Figure 28 shows that Ulster with 1.15 women per men in workhouses
started with the lowest value, Munster started with the lowest fraction of
1.35. The fraction went down below one until 1901 in most counties; values
for 1926 are not included.
The number of families living in fourth class housing can be seen in Fig-
ure 29. 4th class housing is defined as:“Houses built of mud or perishable
material, and having only one room and window” (Census of Ireland, several
years, p.7). 4th class housing includes also 3rd class housing (one to four
rooms and windows) with more than one family, 2nd class housing (five to
nine rooms and windows) with four or more families and 1st class housing
(houses of a better description than the preceding) inhabited by six or more
families.
Fourth class housing can be taken as an indicator for the poverty of
the population, which can have negative effects especially on females, as we
have seen in the theory. Accordingly, we hypothesise that in counties with
particularly bad housing conditions also the relative female mortality will
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Table 2: Proportion never married in an international view (in percent)
England and Wales France Germany Ireland
Year M F M F M F M F
1841 10 12
1851 12 12 12 13
1861 10 12 11 13 15 14
1871 10 12 11 12 9 12 17 16
1881 10 12 13 13 8 11 17 17
1891 10 12 12 13 8 10 20 18
1901 11 14 10 11 8 11 24 22
1911 12 16 11 11 9 12 27 25
Source: Guinnane (1997, page 96)
be particularly high. Poverty can lead to insufficient nutrition especially of
the weakest members of the household, furthermore bad housing conditions
can lead to a higher female mortality from diseases that are contracted while
working in bad conditions at home.
7.5 (Re-)marriage market
In Ireland, a high proportion of men and women never married. One reason
for this phenomenon could be the heritage laws that split up the land among
all siblings, so that it was not possible any more for a family to earn a living
from the land. Also as a dowry it had not enough worth to attract a good
match. Another hindrance was the very strong Catholic Church that made
it almost impossible to divorce.
Table 2 shows that Ireland’s number of spinsters and bachelors is higher
than in other countries. Being normal until the 1860’s, the percentage of
people never married increases from then. In Germany, England and Wales,
the rates stay approximately stable.
The Irish perspective is demonstrated in table 3 where the differences
between the provinces are shown. Connaught, the province with the highest
rate of emigration, lowest industry and highest agriculture, shows the lowest
rate of non-married, especially for women.
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Table 3: Proportion never married in the provinces of Ireland (in percent)
Leinster Ulster Munster Connaught
Year M F M F M F M F
1841 13 14 10 14 9 11 7 8
1851 15 14 13 15 10 10 7 8
1861 19 17 16 16 12 12 10 10
1871 21 19 19 19 13 13 12 12
1881 22 20 19 20 14 13 11 9
1891 25 22 21 23 17 13 14 10
1901 28 25 24 26 20 17 19 14
1911 31 28 26 27 26 21 25 18
Source: Guinnane (1997, page 97)
In my set of data the picture is similar. In Figure 26 the number of
spinsters relative to the number of bachelors is shown. The numbers remain
relatively stable over the whole period with Ulster having the most spinsters
per bachelor (1.2) and with Connaught only having 0.8.
7.6 Emigration
Up to the time of the Famine population growth in Ireland was very high in
relation to other European countries. Exact population growth can only be
calculated from 1841 onwards when the first reliable count of the population
was published in the census (Guinnane, 1997). Over the period 1750 to 1845,
Guinnane (1997) proposes a yearly growth rate of 1.3 percent per year. In
the last years of this period, the growth rate seems to be already lower, as
estimates of Mokyr and Grada (1984) propose only a growth rate of 0.5 to
0.75 percent for the 1830’s. Thus, while the high growth rates were lastingly
stopped by the Famine, Guinnane (1997) argues that they would have sunk
to a normal measure even without the Famine, though during a longer period.
During the Famine, excess mortality ranged from one quarter of the pop-
ulation to almost zero depending on the region (Guinnane and O Grada,
2002). The number of deaths from the famine range from 0.5 to 1.5 million
dependent on the estimate, with the most reliable estimate being one million
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excess deaths which means almost 10 percent of the population (O Grada,
1993). Regarding the past population growth rates we should have expected
that population numbers would have recovered quickly after the famine. In-
stead, population began to decrease severely. There were two main factors
that accounted for this decrease: During the Famine, a huge migration move-
ment mainly to the U.S., but also to England started, and fertility declined
lastingly. In Figure 14, the amount of the population loss can be seen. To
take as an example the population of age 0 to 4, the loss is almost 50 percent
over 50 years. Also the number of men relative to women reverses in most
age groups. For example in the age group 25 to 29, there were significantly
more women in 1871, but there are as many as men in 1926.
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Figure 14: Population loss in Ireland mainly due to emigration
A huge wave of emigration to the USA had already started during the
famine. These very high numbers make it look unlikely that the remaining
population can be compared with a healthy and stable population. Yet the
question arises, what the causal connection between the emigration and a
negative selection of the remaining population is. It is possible that mostly
the healthy and strong persons left the country, because they were still able
to do so, as for instance during the famine. Thus the poor and ill ones
remained in the country. On the other hand it also could be possible that
the high mortality rate stimulated those, who found themselves in the risk
group of dying - the poor and ill, to flee from home.
To measure the effect of emigration on excess female mortality, not only
the numbers of people emigrating could play a role, but much more important
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Figure 15: % of women emigrating rel. to % of men emigrating from Provinces
will be the relation between male and female emigration.
The interesting variable is the relation between emigration of women and
men. In Connaught one can observe the highest emigration of women relative
to men, but not the highest mortality of women in the age groups in which
women are able to decide for themselves (15-24 and 25-34).
7.7 Agricultural change and rural areas
Between 1850 and 1920 agriculture in Ireland changed fundamentally. After
the famine, several developments started: firstly, there was a shift from tillage
to grazing. In the 1840s half of the output consisted of crops (wheat, oats and
potatoes), in 1908 farmyard hen and duck contributed more to agricultural
value added than all crops together (O Grada, 1993). This was made possible,
among other things, by the change in the heritage practice which changed
from dividing the land among all siblings to giving the whole land to one
heir.
The change in agriculture is captured first by the share of small farms
relative to all farms. Figure 24 shows particularly in the most agricultural
district, Connaught, that the number of small farms went down. That hap-
pened possibly due to the changes in the heritage laws that put a halt to the
progressive division of land.
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The change of production in agriculture is proxied by the share of the
county area that is cultivated with crops, fruit and horticulture. The variable
is shown in Figure 25. The downturn which is expected can be confirmed,
but on a very low level. The share of the area cultivated diminishes from a
starting point of 5 to 8 percent by 2 percentage points, meaning a downturn
of at least 25%.
The agricultural change went along with different occurrences. First of
all, there was a dramatic fall in the numbers of people working on the land,
so that a negative effect on land workers has to be expected. Furthermore,
the regional specialisation in agriculture shifted, but it brought only little
sustained growth in aggregate value of farm output. Nevertheless, the pro-
ductivity growth was rather high. While output per worker remained low
compared to Britain, the gap narrowed over time with a higher TFP than in
Britain.
O Grada (1993) argues that changes in Irish farming patterns (induced
by market conditions, embourgeoisement and technological change) reduced
women’s entitlement relative to men’s.
7.8 Education
Traditionally, women in Ireland had almost no rights. Girls and women had
to have their meals after men and sons had eaten and they had to show
consideration for them in many ways. School education was denied to more
girls than boys, as women were regarded as not capable to make use of the
acquired knowledge. If girls were offered school education at all, there were
special curricula and books, in order to prepare them for their future life
at home, that is, they learnt cooking, needlework etc. People believed that
knowledge should be given to women only to a degree that should enable
them to become a helpful housewife (Luddy, 1999).
Literacy and school attendance are both good indicators for the back-
wardness and poverty of a country. Two arguments back up this thesis: on
one hand a civilisation (culture) of poverty can lower the demand for school
education, on the other hand it can be that families cannot afford school
education because of their poverty.
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The first argument, that poverty lowers demand for education, does not
apply to Ireland according to O Grada (1993). He quotes Wakefield (1812)
with the statement: “I do not know of any part of Ireland so wild that its
inhabitants are not anxious, nay eagerly anxious for the education of their
children”.
The second argument, that people cannot afford education, was weakened
by the Intermediate act of 1878, which intended to ameliorate school educa-
tion and preparation for university. First it was only thought for boys, until
several influential women pushed it through to be valid for all pupils (Luddy,
1999). In this act it was laid down that there should exist a central insti-
tution, which organised examinations and awarded prizes to the teachers.
Moreover there were grants for boys and girls equally. The Irish education
act of 1892 made school attendance compulsory for all children. Only from
then girls went to school almost the same as boys. Yet it was unusual for
girls to continue school after primary school. Nevertheless, several schools
were opened in the 1860’s in Dublin and Belfast, which offered secondary
education to girls. This was the most remarkable development in the school
system in the Ireland of the 19th century.
In spite of all these improvements there were still discussions that the
female brain was not able to perform as well as the male one. Therefore at
school girls were mostly prepared for their future life as housewives: they
learned cooking, household management, child care etc. There were even
special schoolbooks for the education of girls (Luddy, 1999).
Apart from better education and thus higher independence, which women
could reach by school attendance, also relatively marginal facts played a role
for the improvement of the girls’ situation attending school. At school they
normally got a meal, often the only one they had during the day. Thus beside
the long term perspectives the short term perspectives also improved. When
the school enrolment rate is high in a low developed country, school atten-
dance provides the girls with a healthier surrounding than is to be expected
at home. A high rate of female enrolment is moreover a sign of esteem of
girls, as it seems worthwhile for parents to invest in school education. Argu-
ing with theoretical considerations, we can say that a higher literacy among
adult women leads to a better bargaining position in the family, so their
mortality rate should decrease.
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The highest share of illiterate women relative to all women can be ob-
served in Munster and Ulster, the lowest in Connaught (see figure 27).
7.9 Number of births
The number of births often leads to maternal mortality in reproduction ages
when health care is of a low standard. As a proxy for fertility rates, I use
the number of births per woman aged 20 to 44 during the year of the census.
Births to women are depicted in Figure 31 and show that the lowest birth
rates were in 1881 and fertility rose from then. The lowest value was almost
only 0.8 children per woman in Connaught, in 1926 the rate is up at least to
1.4. Ulster always shows the highest rate, so fertility seems to be related to
urbanisation.
Table 4: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Explanatories to 1926, 127 observations
EFM 10 to 19 1.246 0.337
EFM 25 to 44 1.161 0.264
Overall Mortality rate 16.096 2.98
Females to males working 0.469 0.197
Share of workforce in prof. sector 0.116 0.059
Share of workforce in agriculture 0.519 0.146
Share of adults without job 0.202 0.076
Share of adult women in industry 0.102 0.063
Share of adult women in dom. sector 0.242 0.144
Share of adult women in prof. sector 0.047 0.021
Spinsters to Bachelors 0.816 0.136
Emigration women to men 1.005 0.263
No. of births per adult woman per year 0.108 0.02
Share of farms 1 to 5 acres 0.133 0.055
Share of tilled area 0.062 0.064
Population density 0.28 0.385
Explanatories only to 1901, 107 observations
Share of illiterate women 0.75 0.12
Female to male workhouse inmates 1.13 0.147
Fam. in 4th class housing 0.066 0.069
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8 Estimation Results
I want to explain the excess female mortality split up into different age
groups, counties, and time spans. This will give a panel of observations,
which will be explained by time and county variables. There are no time
invariant county variables in my explanatory variables list so that they all
can be estimated in the framework of a panel model.
The dependent variable is excess female mortality in two age groups, 10
to 19 and 25 to 44. The estimated parameters increase women’s mortality
relative to men’s if they are positive. In case of a positive parameter one can
speak about a negative influence of the explanatory variable on women.
First I estimate a random effects panel model (which turned out to be
the correct specification after having carried out a Hausman test) with only
time dummies as explanatory variables. If there is a considerable variation
in the rates that cannot be explained by time and random effects, I will try
to explain the remaining variation in a second step. The regression results
are shown in Table 5. Most age categories show that excess female mortality
was rising over time, the two age groups that are chosen for the next esti-
mation step show an R2 of around 12%. Thus, there is a considerable part
of the variation in the dependent variable that can be explained by further
explanatories.
Table 6 shows the regression results when we use the explanatory variables
described in chapter 7 to explain excess female mortality. I only include the
age groups 10 to 19 as the girls category being below motherhood age and 25
to 44 as the group of adult women. In column (1) and (3), the longer panel
including 1926 is used, in column (2) and (4), I use a shorter panel only until
1901 but with more explanatory variables. After testing with the Hausman
Test, the age group 10 to 19 is estimated by panel random effects, while the
age group 25 to 44 is estimated by OLS. An F-Test on the fixed effects could
not reject the Null Hypothesis that all fixed effects are zero and the σui of the
random effects turned out to be zero, so a classical OLS regression applies
(Greene, 1997). Again, the random effects of the first age group refer to the
counties and the data are county averages or sums. Overall, the regression
explains between 20 and 40 percent of the variation in the data in column
(1) to (4) and ends up in explaining at least another 8% of the variance of
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Excess female mortality relative to regression in Table 5.
Table 5: Panel regression random effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EFM EFM EFM EFM EFM
10 to 14 15 to 19 10 to 19 20 to 24 25 to 44
1881 -0.101 0.065 -0.008 0.076 0.036
(0.85) (0.59) (0.10) (0.87) (0.73)
1891 0.085 0.264* 0.168* 0.164+ 0.078
(0.71) (2.41) (2.22) (1.88) (1.56)
1901 0.111 0.359** 0.242** 0.104 0.081
(0.93) (3.24) (3.17) (1.17) (1.60)
1926 0.266* 0.363** 0.276** 0.491** 0.253**
(2.05) (3.03) (3.34) (5.17) (4.62)
Constant 1.320** 1.065** 1.152** 0.797** 0.958**
(14.49) (12.56) (19.50) (12.81) (22.71)
No. of obs. 127 127 127 127 127
Counties 27 27 27 27 27
R-squared 0.0524 0.1069 0.1270 0.1971 0.1257
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Now, the estimated coefficients are compared to the hypotheses and also
to results of McNay, Humphries, and Klasen (2002). They have estimated
excess female mortality of the age groups 10-19 and 20-44 in England and
Wales in 1860.
Overall mortality has no positive effect on women, as would have been
expected from the hypotheses. A possible reason is that the times are not
as extreme as famine times, so that mortality of girls is not affected. Excess
mortality of women rises with higher mortality rates, maybe because they
form quite a big part of the overall mortality. That contradicts our hypothesis
and also the findings of McNay, Humphries, and Klasen (2002) who find at
least a negative relationship in the girls category.
The next variable shows the labour market participation of women rel-
ative to men with the hypothesis that a higher labour market participation
should give them more power in the struggle over resources in the household.
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For adult women, the hypothesis seems to hold, excess female mortality di-
minishes with rising labour market participation of women. The hypothesis
that girls should profit from the stronger mothers cannot be accepted, the
influence is not significant.
The structure of the economy is only captured with the next two variables,
workers in agriculture and in the professional sector. The left-out category
is the domestic sector and industry. There seems not to be an influence of
the structure of the economy on women’s or girls’ mortality, only agricultural
work influences women negatively. McNay, Humphries, and Klasen (2002)
find that employment in agriculture is detrimental to women and girls, the
rest of the sectors are not different from each other. The results are consistent
in the finding of a negative influence of agricultural work on women. The
hypothesis was that rural regions lag behind in the equality of mortality rates
between genders, our findings confirm this theory. The number of people with
no job does not influence the mortality of women relative to men.
The structure of women’s work is one of the most important explanatory
factors, because the hypotheses are the strongest. Labour market partici-
pation per se is positive for women, as we have seen. Bad work conditions
in typical women’s jobs could reverse the positive result on mortality. And
we see that industry work is detrimental to women’s health and the positive
effect of higher power is reversed by unhealthy work. Domestic work shows
also a tendency to be negative for women. The interaction term between the
dummy for 1871 and the domestic work is not significant, even if we have
seen in the descriptive chapter that there was a huge downturn in female
employment from 1871 to 1881. The professional sector does not influence
excess female mortality. The influence of women’s work on girls’ mortality is
not significant at all, while we had expected a negative influence of the moth-
ers’ work on girls if girls suffer from the bad working conditions of women.
McNay, Humphries, and Klasen (2002) find a positive influence of women
working in agriculture on both girls and women, while women working in
manufacturing are bad for girls and women. With respect to manufacturing,
the effect on women is the same in England and Ireland.
The remarriage market is proxied by the percentage of spinsters on bach-
elors and with a lower number, women are expected to have a higher power
because of their better outside option and should have a lower excess mortal-
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ity. The variable does not show a significant influence. McNay, Humphries,
and Klasen (2002) proxy the remarriage market with the number of women
to men aged 20 to 24 and find a negative significance for both age categories
meaning a positive influence on women. That contradicts the hypothesis of
the remarriage variable that should enhance women’s status with a lower
number of competitors on the remarriage market.
The very high emigration from Ireland could lead to either a lower or a
higher excess mortality of women dependent on who leaves the country, the
sick to find a better living or the only strong, because the sick were too weak
to leave. The regression result shows that a higher emigration of women
relative to men leads to a higher excess mortality in both age groups. Thus
it seems to be the sick that have to stay.
The number of births and the two agricultural indicators do not have a
significant influence on excess female mortality.
Population density is good for girls, but bad for women. To rationalise
the finding it could be argued that bad housing conditions and hard work in
cities has a bad influence on women, while the higher availability of schools
with regular meals and health care is good for girls.
The percentage of women that are illiterate and the ratio of women to
men in workhouses shows a negative influence on girls, not on women; 4th
class housing is not significant.
But the question still remains, why Ireland experienced such high excess
female mortality. From the comparison with England and Wales, some hy-
potheses can be deducted. The first factor to be different between the coun-
tries seems to be the high emigration which leaves the poorest and weakest
at home. A further factor might be that poor relief seems to be more efficient
in England than in Ireland. While the percentage of women dependent on
poor relief lowers excess female mortality in England, the share of women
relative to men in workhouses in Ireland shows a tendency towards increas-
ing excess female mortality. Ireland has a much higher share of agricultural
employment than England (52 to 33%) and in both countries, the share
of agricultural work increases excess female mortality. Thus, with a much
higher share, Ireland’s mortality pattern can be explained. The participation
rate of women in industry is not significantly different between the countries
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and also the height of the influence is very similar, so the structure of female
labour market participation cannot be an explanation.
9 Conclusions
The aim of the paper was to go beyond a descriptive study of why Irish
excess female mortality was exceptionally high at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century. Several studies have described the phenomenon and possible
explanatory factors (e.g. Fahey (2003) or Kennedy (1973)).
Many studies have estimated the factors that influence excess female mor-
tality and have calculated the resulting number of missing women for other
countries and times. For the existence of excess female mortality, inequalities
in the division of resources between women and men are needed. General
findings are that sectoral changes influence women’s mortality if a traditional
female sector shrinks or gains in efficiency by new technologies. An example
of this is the agricultural sector that changed dramatically in Europe in the
19th century.
My findings on the influence of labour market participation of women
are in line with the results found earlier on England and Wales (McNay,
Humphries, and Klasen, 2002) and with theories of intra-household resource
allocation. I find that women’s situation improves with a higher labour
market participation. But, as working conditions are detrimental to health
during the observed period, a higher female participation in sectors such as
the industrial sector ruins the gains in power over family resources. A special
Irish pattern regarding labour market participation of women cannot be read
from the regression results.
The emigration out of Ireland cannot be compared to any of the earlier
analyses of any country, because it was exceptionally high. The hypothesis of
authors working on Irish excess female mortality that the society in Ireland
cannot be regarded as a sound population are confirmed by the regression
results.
With a much higher share of agricultural work in Ireland than for example
in England and with a negative influence of agricultural work on women, the
high excess female mortality can be explained besides the high emigration.
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Table 6: Panel regression 2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EFM EFM EFM EFM
10 to 19 10 to 19 25 to 44 25 to 44
Mortality rate 0.008 -0.017 0.040** 0.014
(0.47) (0.77) (3.71) (0.91)
W to m working 0.190 1.081 -1.745+ -2.086*
(0.14) (0.87) (1.98) (2.23)
Workers in prof 0.685 0.832 -1.772 -1.332
(0.28) (0.33) (1.13) (0.79)
Workers in agr 0.395 -1.177 1.615+ 1.073
(0.29) (0.83) (1.86) (1.09)
Pop. with nojob 1.105 0.699 -0.373 0.376
(0.73) (0.49) (0.38) (0.34)
W in ind. 1.013 -1.089 3.130** 2.921*
(0.59) (0.60) (2.81) (2.26)
W in dom 0.550 -0.814 2.688+ 2.265
(0.25) (0.39) (1.87) (1.48)
W in dom*1871 0.137 1.404 -1.334 -0.103
(0.07) (0.85) (1.08) (0.08)
W in prof -0.716 -5.163 4.431 1.909
(0.15) (0.94) (1.41) (0.48)
Population density -0.252+ -0.319+ 0.160+ 0.079
(1.71) (1.65) (1.68) (0.62)
W to m in workh. 0.635* 0.212
(2.39) (1.11)
4th class housing -0.164 0.134
(0.15) (0.17)
Spinst. to Bach. -0.158 -0.295 0.088 0.303
(0.30) (0.54) (0.26) (0.81)
W to m emig -0.045 0.656** 0.217+ 0.091
(0.23) (3.20) (1.74) (0.59)
Perc. of tilled area 0.141 0.848 -0.309 -0.283
(0.23) (0.56) (0.79) (0.29)
Share of small farms 0.806 0.208 0.011 0.030
Continued on next page...
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... table 6 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EFM EFM EFM EFM
10 to 19 10 to 19 25 to 44 25 to 44
(0.98) (0.22) (0.02) (0.05)
Women illit. 0.987* 0.333
(2.01) (1.03)
Births to women -0.003 0.683 0.002 0.408
(1.11) (0.75) (0.77) (0.61)
1881 0.183 0.837 -0.775+ -0.301
(0.26) (1.39) (1.70) (0.67)
1891 0.364 0.971+ -0.684+ -0.296
(0.58) (1.87) (1.67) (0.76)
1901 0.369 0.759 -0.621 -0.361
(0.62) (1.53) (1.62) (0.97)
1926 0.673 -0.085
(1.22) (0.24)
Constant 0.135 -1.017 -0.129 -0.325
(0.08) (0.51) (0.12) (0.23)
Observations 127 107 127 107
Counties 27 27 27 27
R-squared 0.29 0.35 0.42 0.21
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
(1) and (2): Random effects, (3) and (4) OLS
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Figure 16: Overall mortality rates
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Figure 17: Percentage of Men and Women over 20 years working in the
professional sector (based on census data; own calculation)
60
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
ag
r_
pe
rc
26
1871 1881 1891 1901 1926
year
Connaught Leinster
Munster Ulster
Ulster (ROI)
Figure 18: Percentage of Men and Women over 20 years working in agricul-
tural sector (based on census data; own calculation)
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Figure 19: Percentage of Men and Women over 20 years not working rel. to
population (based on census data; own calculation)
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Figure 20: Women working to men (based on census data; own calculation)
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Figure 21: Share of adult women in industry (based on census data; own
calculation)
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Figure 22: Share of adult women in domestic sector (based on census data;
own calculation)
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Figure 23: Share of adult women in the professional sector (based on census
data; own calculation)
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Figure 24: Small farms relative to all farms (based on census data; own
calculation)
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Figure 25: Share of county area cultivated with crops, fruit and horticulture
(based on Irish Farm Statistics)
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Figure 26: Spinsters rel. to bachelors (based on census data; own calculation)
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Figure 27: Share of illiterate women over five relative to all women over five
(based on census data; own calculation)
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Figure 28: Women in workhouses to men in workhouses (based on census
data; own calculation)
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Figure 29: Share of families living in 4th class housing (based on census data;
own calculation)
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Figure 30: Population density (based on census data; own calculation)
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Figure 31: Number of births relative to women married women 20 to 44
(based on census data; own calculation)
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Determinants of East-West Migration
of Employees in Germany∗
Abstract
Since the inequality of earnings in East Germany has approached
West German levels in the late 1990s, the standard Roy model pre-
dicts that a positive selection bias of East-West migrants should dis-
appear. Using a switching regression model and data from the IAB-
employment sample, we find however that employed East-West mi-
grants remain positively self-selected with respect to unobserved abil-
ities. This result is consistent with the predictions of our extended
Roy model which considers moving costs that are negatively corre-
lated with labour market abilities of individuals. Moreover, we find
that wage differentials as well as differences in employment oppor-
tunities are the central forces which drive East-West migration after
unification.
∗This paper has originally been coauthored by Herbert Brücker and has been called:
Do the Best go West?
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1 Introduction
Cumulative net migration from East to West Germany amounts to 1.3 mil-
lion persons or 7.5 per cent of the original population in East Germany over
the period from 1989 until the end of 2001. With that number, East Ger-
many shows together with Albania the highest emigration rate among the
countries formerly behind the iron curtain. Although net emigration rates
in East Germany declined sharply after the currency union was announced,
East-West migration has tended to increase again since 1996. The persistent
phenomenon of East-West migration has raised increasing concerns that in-
dividuals with high abilities and qualifications migrate to the West and that
this “brain drain” will contribute further to sluggish economic growth and
diverging per capita income levels.
Indeed, for an understanding of the economic consequences of migration
an analysis of the forces which drive the composition of the migrant pop-
ulation is crucial. The impact of migration on wages and employment op-
portunities of natives as well as the labour market performance and welfare
dependency of the migrants themselves is determined by the structure of the
migrant population with respect to their abilities and human capital charac-
teristics. Thus, the self-selection of migrants has important consequences for
economic growth, labour markets and the fiscal balance of the welfare state.
The self-selection of migrants has attracted increasing attention in the
migration literature since the seminal paper of Borjas (1987), who applied
the Roy (1951) model to the migration decision. In the Roy model, the self-
selection of individuals depends essentially on the relative returns to their
abilities, such that the distribution of income in the home and the host
region determines the composition of migrants. As a result, migrants were
positively selected at the inequality in the distribution of income is higher
in the host region than in the home region – and vice versa (Borjas, 1987,
pp. 551-52). Thus, the standard Roy model predicts that migrants from the
East were positively selected at the beginning of the transition process, since
the distribution of earnings was more equal in East Germany than in West
Germany in the early 1990s. However, this positive selection bias should
have disappeared over time, as the inequality of earnings in East Germany
has meanwhile almost approached West German levels (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Wage Inequality in East and West Germany
The strong results from the standard Roy model are, however, controver-
sial, especially because the empirical evidence provided for its predictions is
not conclusive. Borjas (1987) analyses the the development of earnings of
migrants in the host region, which allows no direct inference on the ques-
tion of whether migrants are drawn from the upper or the lower tail of the
income distribution in their home countries. Moreover, Borjas’ (1987) con-
clusion that the “quality” of US migrants has declined over time has been
questioned (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1990). Thus, many authors argue that
migrants are presumably favourably selected although the variance of earn-
ings is higher in the home region relative to the host region.
An empirical analysis of selection bias in the context of international
migration is seriously hampered by a lack of individual data. Household
panels in the home countries usually do not allow international emigrants to
be identified - they simply disappear from the panel. Thus, although we have
rich information on immigrants in many host countries, the phenomenon of
self-selection cannot be addressed systematically on the basis of standard
data sources.
German unification offers a unique opportunity to study the problem of
the selection of migrants. There exist several micro data sets that allow East-
West migrants to be identified before and after movement. We employ the
“IAB-Regionalstichprobe”, which is a one per cent sample of individuals who
are registered by the German social security system and includes individuals
in both parts of Germany. This data set enables us to analyse whether and
to what extent relative returns to abilities affect the self-sorting of East-
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West migrants. The empirical framework is based on a switching regression
model (Goldfeld and Quandt, 1973) with endogenous switching (Maddala
and Nelson, 1975; Maddala, 1983). The switching regression model can be
derived from the Roy model and was first applied in the context of migration
decisions by Nakosteen and Zimmer (1984). It makes it possible not only to
estimate the wage differential for (prospective) migrants consistently, but also
enables us to draw inferences on the selection bias of the migrant population.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: firstly, we briefly
review the findings of the empirical literature on East-West migration in
Germany (Section 2). Secondly, we present an extended version of Roy’s
model which considers the correlation between moving costs and abilities of
individuals in the labour market. As a result, the strong predictions of Roy’s
model are relaxed or even reversed (Section 3). Thirdly, we describe the data
base (Section 4) and analyse the socio-economic characteristics of migrants
(Section 5). Fourthly, we present the switching regression model and discuss
the econometric results (Section 6). In conclusion we summarise our findings
and their implications for the theory and empirics of self-selection (Section
7).
2 Empirical literature
There exists a large body of literature on East-West migration in Germany
that addresses the problem of self-selection at least partially. At first glance,
this literature seems to confirm the hypothesis that “those who emigrate
tend to be better educated and possibly better workers in unobservable ways
than stayers” (Burda and Hunt, 2001, p. 65). In her comprehensive analy-
sis of German East-West migration, Hunt (2000) finds, based on individual
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), that migrants are
disproportionately high skilled if controlling for age and gender. However,
they are disproportionately low skilled if those control variables are not in-
cluded. Hunt interprets this as evidence that, in particular, the young and
high-skilled tend to move. Based on an analysis of migration intentions as
revealed in the GSOEP, Burda (1993) shows that those having completed
secondary schooling with an Abitur (academic secondary schooling exam)
intend to move over proportionally, while those with a university or other
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tertiary education degree intend to move less frequently than other educa-
tion groups (Burda, 1993, p. 460). Similar results can be found in Burda,
Härdle, Müller, and Werwatz (1998). In contrast, the results of Schwarze
(1996) indicate that years of education are positively correlated with migra-
tion intentions as well as with actual migration. Analogously, Pischke, Staat,
and Vögele (1994) show on basis of data from the “Arbeitsmarktmonitor”
that East-West commuters possess higher skill levels than stayers.
Moreover, the results in the empirical literature regarding the impact of
the wage differential on the propensity to migrate are ambiguous. While
Schwarze (1996) finds that the wage differential affects individual migration
probabilities positively, the results of Hunt (2000) and Burda, Härdle, Müller,
and Werwatz (1998) indicate that no unambiguous correlation between the
wage differential and the propensity to migrate exists. Burda, Härdle, Müller,
and Werwatz (1998) interpret the non-linear relation between the income
differential and migration probabilities in their estimates as evidence for the
option value of waiting theory of migration. However, to the best of our
knowledge, no paper on the determinants of East-West migration considers
the self-selection of migrants. Thus, the results might be affected by selection
bias.
Altogether, the results of the empirical literature regarding the question
whether migrants from East Germany are positively selected are not conclu-
sive. Furthermore, the empirical literature on the determinants of East-West
migration does not consider the selection of migrants with regard to unob-
servable abilities in the labour market, which may bias their results.
3 Theoretical framework
The self-selection of migrants is affected by various factors since both the
benefits as well as the costs of migration are not equally distributed across
the population. The Roy model offers a rigourous and theoretically powerful
framework to analyse the self-selection of individuals. According to the Roy
model, self-selection is driven by comparative advantage of individuals. As
a consequence, the distribution of income in the host and the home region
determines whether individuals with higher or lower abilities tend to migrate:
if the distribution of income in the host region is more equal than in the home
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region, and if the correlation between the incomes of (potential) migrants in
both locations is positive, migrants are chosen from the lower tail of the
income distribution and vice versa (Borjas, 1987, pp. 551-52).
In its original formulation, the Roy model does not consider any switching
costs. In the context of migration, pecuniary and non-pecuniary moving costs
are, however, an important factor which cannot be ignored in the analysis
of the migration decision. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that abilities
relevant for the labour market performance of individuals and moving costs
are negatively correlated, i.e. that the same human capital characteristics
which yield higher returns in the labour market allow individuals to better
reduce moving costs. In this more general framework, migrants may be cho-
sen from the upper tail of the income distribution although the distribution
of income in the host region is more equal than in the home region.1
In what follows, we discuss first the mechanics of an extended Roy model
which considers the correlation between labour market abilities and moving
costs in order to derive the framework for the empirical analysis and then
present the estimation model.
3.1 An extension of the Roy model
Suppose that w1 is the wage of residents in the home region (region 1), and
w2 the wage of residents in the host region (region 2). Assume that log wages
in region 1 and region 2 have a joint normal distribution, such that
ln w1 = µ1 + ε1, (1)
where µ1 is the mean of the log wage in region 1 and ε1 a normally distributed
disturbance with zero mean and variance σ21. Analogously,
ln w2 = µ2 + ε2, (2)
where ε2 is normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ
2
2. The Roy
model focuses on the impact of selection bias on the disturbances ε1 and ε2,
1A similar point has recently been made by Chiswick (2000): He demonstrates in a
numerical example that the strong implications of the Roy model are relaxed if fixed
moving costs are considered.
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which can be interpreted as (unobservable) abilities of individuals.
The original Roy model ignores all switching costs, i.e. an individual
from region 1 migrates into region 2 if w2 > w1. However, it is reasonable to
assume that moving costs exist and that they are related to human capital
characteristics and other abilities of individuals. Suppose that C represents
the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of migration as a proportion of home
income. Migration occurs if w2−w1
w1
> C, or, approximately, if ln w2− ln w1 >
C. Assume that C is normally distributed with mean τ and disturbance η,
i.e.
C = τ + η, (3)
and that η ∼ N(0, σ2η). The decision to migrate is then determined by the
sign of the index function, I∗, which contains the wage gain from moving
minus the costs of migration:
I∗ = µ2 − µ1 − τ + ε2 − ε1 − η, (4)
i.e. an individual migrates if I∗ > 0, and stays at home if I∗ ≤ 0.
Define
σ∗ =
√
Var(ε2 − ε1 − η), z = −µ2 − µ1 − τ
σ∗
, and ε =
ε2 − ε1 − η
σ∗
.
Migration occurs if ε > z. Under the normality assumptions, the migra-
tion rate m is given by
m = Pr(ε > z) = 1− Φ(z), (5)
where Φ() is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal.
Using the standard sample selection formula (Heckman, 1976, 1979), the
(unobserved) wage of a migrant in the home region can be written as
E(ln w1|I∗ > 0) = µ1 + σ1ελ(z), (6)
and the observed wage in the host region as
E(ln w2|I∗ > 0) = µ2 + σ2ελ(z), (7)
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where σ1ε and σ2ε are the covariance of ε1 and ε, and the covariance of ε2
and ε, respectively, and
λ(z) =
φ(z)
1− Φ(z)
is the inverse of Mills’ ratio and φ() the density of the standard normal.
Whether migrants are better or worse off than the average person in the
home and the host region depends on the sign of the second term in the
equations (6) and (7). Since λ(z) ≥ 0 by definition, the average migrant
is better off than the average person in the home region if σ1ε > 0, and,
analogously, better off than the average person in the host region if σ2ε > 0
– if we ignore the limiting case that λ(z) = 0.
An interpretation of these conditions requires that we decompose σ1ε and
σ2ε. Using the definition for the covariance, we can rewrite σ1ε as
σ1ε =
σ12 − σ21 − σ1η
σ∗
,
and σ2ε as
σ2ε =
σ22 − σ12 − σ2η
σ∗
.
Thus, we can derive two fundamental conditions for the favourable self-
selection of migrants: firstly, migrants are better off than the average person
in the home population if σ12 > σ
2
1 + σ1η, or if
σ2
σ1
>
1
ρ12
+
ρ1η
ρ12
ση
σ1
, (8)
where ρ12 is the correlation coefficient between ε1 and ε2, and ρ1η the corre-
lation coefficient between ε1 and η. We assume for the further analysis that
ρ12 > 0, since a negative correlation between earnings in both regions makes
no sense economically. Note that the second term on the right-hand side
captures the correlation between labour-market abilities and moving costs.
Since we assume that labour-market abilities and moving costs are nega-
tively correlated, i.e. that ρ1η < 0, the second term is negative, and, hence,
increases the probability of a favourable selection of migrants relative to the
average person in the home population for a given variance of earnings in the
host and the home region.
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Secondly, the migrant is better off than the average person in the host
region if σ22 > σ12 + σ2η , or if
σ2
σ1
> ρ12 + ρ2η
ση
σ1
, (9)
where ρ2η is the correlation coefficient between ε2 and η. Once again, since
we assume that ρ2η < 0, the second term on the right-hand side increases
the probability of a favourable selection of migrants relative to the average
person in the host population for a given variance of earnings in the host and
the home region.
3.2 Comparative Statics
Consider now the implications of the model for a change in the economic con-
ditions underlying the (self-)selection of migrants. We can write the selection
bias of migrants relative to the average person in the home population as
Sj = Sj (ω,C, σ1, σ2, η, ρ12, ρ1η, ρ2η) , j ∈ {1, 2}
where ω ≡ µ2 − µ1 is the income difference between the host and the home
region. The second terms in equations (6) and (7) show that the selection
bias in the home region is given by
S1 = σ1ελ(z),
and in the host region by
S2 = σ2ελ(z).
We can thus write the impact of a change in any variable x on the change in
S1 and S2 as
∂S1
∂x
=
∂σ1ε
∂x
λ +
∂λ
∂x
σ1ε, (10)
and as
∂S2
∂x
=
∂σ2ε
∂x
λ +
∂λ
∂x
σ2ε. (11)
The first term on the right-hand side in equations (10) and (11) captures the
composition effect for a constant scale of migration, and the second term the
scale effect for a given composition of the migrant population (Borjas, 1987).
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We focus here on the selection bias of migrants relative to the average
person in the home region. Define k = σ2ρ12 − σ1 − σηρ1η. k has a positive
sign if σ2
σ1
> 1
ρ12
+ ρ1η
ρ12
ση
σ1
, i.e. if migrants are positively selected, and a negative
one, if otherwise.
Consider first the impact of a change in the difference of earnings between
the host and the home region. Using equation (10) it can be shown that
∂S1
∂ω
= − σ1
σ∗2
∂λ
∂z
k, (12)
i.e. a change in the income differential affects the composition of migrants
only via the scale effect. An increase in the difference of earnings between
the host and the home region reduces the positive (negative) selection bias
of the migrant population if they are positively (negatively) selected. The
intuition behind this result is that a higher difference in earnings increases
the share of migrants in the population, which in turn reduces the selection
bias in both directions, since migrants are increasingly drawn from the mean
parts of the income distribution.
Increasing the mean costs of migration has the opposite effect, i.e.
∂S1
∂C
=
σ1
σ∗2
∂λ
∂z
k, (13)
since increasing moving costs reduces the share of migrants in the population,
which in turn increases the selection bias of the migrant population.
The impact of a change in the inequality of earnings on the selection bias
is ambiguous. The derivation of S1 with respect to σ1 yields
∂S1
∂σ1
=
2σ1 k
2 − (σ1 − k) σ∗2
σ∗3
λ +
σ1k
2
σ∗3
∂λ
∂z
z, (14)
where the sign of the first term – the composition effect – is positive if
2σ1 (σ1 − ρ12σ2 + ρ1ηση)2 > (2σ1 − ρ12σ2 + ρ1ηση) σ∗2, which depends on the
value of the parameters. The impact of the second term – the scale effect
– depends on the sign of z. If the net difference in mean earnings (incl.
moving costs) is positive (i.e. z < 0), the scale effect is negative, and positive
if otherwise. Intuitively, with a higher inequality of earnings in the home
region, the incentives to migrate for those who are better off decline, while
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those at the lower tail of the income distribution still want to migrate, such
that the migrant population becomes increasingly negatively selected with
an increasing inequality of income in the home region.
The effect of an increasing inequality of earnings in the host region is again
ambiguous. Analogously to equation (14), a derivation of S2 with respect to
σ2 gives
∂S1
∂σ2
=
σ1 (ρ12 σ
∗2 − k n)
σ∗3
λ − k n σ1
σ∗3
∂λ
∂z
z, (15)
where n is defined as σ2 + ρ12σ1 − ρ23ση > 0. The composition effect has a
positive sign if ρ12σ
∗2 > kn, which is always the case if a negative selection
bias of the migrant population exists. In the converse case, the sign of the
composition effect depends on the sign of the individual parameters. The
scale effect is positive if migrants are positively selected and the net difference
in earnings between the host and the home region is positive (i.e. z < 0), and
negative in the converse case. Thus, an increase in the inequality of earnings
in the host region strengthens a given selection bias in both directions via
the scale effect if the difference in net earnings is positive, while it reduces
a negative selection bias via the composition effect, and is ambiguous if a
positive selection bias exists.
Finally, we can assess the implications of a change in the correlation
coefficients. The derivation of the change in S1 with respect to a change in
the correlation coefficients is given by
∂S1
∂ρ12
= k
σ21σ2
σ∗
λ − k σ
2
1σ2
σ∗3
∂λ
∂z
z, (16)
∂S1
∂ρ1η
= k
σ21ση
σ∗
λ − k σ
2
1ση
σ∗3
∂λ
∂z
z, (17)
and
∂S1
∂ρ2η
= k
σ1σ2ση
σ∗
λ − k σ1σ2ση
σ∗3
∂λ
∂z
z. (18)
In all three equations, the composition effect and the scale effect have the
same sign if the net difference in mean earnings (incl. moving costs) between
the host and the home is positive (z < 0), and the converse sign if the net
difference in mean earnings is negative (z > 0). Thus, an increasing (positive)
correlation between earnings in the home and the host region strengthens
the selection bias both via the composition effect and the scale effect if the
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net difference in earnings is positive. In contrast, an increasing (negative)
correlation between labour market abilities and moving costs weakens the
selection bias if the net difference in earnings is positive.
To sum up, the mechanics of the enhanced Roy model demonstrates that
(i) a higher variance of earnings in the home region relative to the host region
does not necessarily yield a negative selection bias of the migrant population,
(ii) a positive selection bias is more likely to occur if we consider the cor-
relation between labour market abilities and moving costs, (iii) increasing
the difference in net earnings between the home and the host region reduces
the selection bias of the migrant population, (iv) increasing the (positive)
correlation between earnings in both regions strengthens the selection bias,
and (v) increasing the (negative) correlation between earnings and moving
costs weakens the selection bias. Increasing the inequality of earnings in the
home as well in the host region has an ambiguous effect on the selection bias.
The scale effect weakens the selection bias if the inequality of home earnings
increases and if the net difference in earnings is positive, and strengthens the
selection bias if the inequality of host earnings increases. The sign of the
composition effect depends on the value of the parameters of the model.
Thus, in the case of East-West migration in Germany, different forces
may have affected the selection bias of the migrant population in different
directions: first, the increasing inequality of earnings in the East may have
reduced the incentives to migrate for those at the upper tail of the income
distribution via the scale effect, and, hence, may have reduced the positive
selection bias. Second, the convergence of wages between East and West Ger-
many may have resulted in less migration, and, hence, increased the positive
selection bias. Third, reduced moving costs may have increased migration
and thus reduced the positive selection bias. Altogether, the increasing in-
equality of earnings in East Germany does not necessarily negatively affect
the selection of migrants with regard to their abilities.
3.3 Estimation
The Roy model as described above can be considered a switching regression
model (Goldfeld and Quandt, 1973) with endogenous switching (Maddala
and Nelson, 1975; Maddala, 1983).
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Rewrite the wage equations in (1) and (2) as
ln w1i = X1iβ1 + ε1i, (19)
and
ln w2i = X2iβ2 + ε2i, (20)
where Xi is a vector of personal variables which is observed for each individual
i. In the empirical application, we also consider regional and sectoral control
variables. Suppose that the index function for the ith individual is given by
I∗i = δ(ln w2i − ln w1i)− Ziγ − ηi, (21)
where δ denotes a coefficient, Ziγ + ηi = Ci the migration cost, and Zi
again a vector of regional and personal variables. Note that the coefficient
δ implies that migration is a log-linear function of the income difference, i.e.
the functional form which we employ here for estimation differs slightly from
the theoretical model. Identification of the model requires that at least one
variable in Zi is not included in the vector Xi.
It is obvious from the discussion of the Roy model that the index func-
tion cannot be estimated in structural form since the term ln w2i − ln w1i is
endogenous. Following Lee (1978) and Willis and Rosen (1979) the model
can be estimated in three steps. In the first step we estimate a reduced form
of the migration function. The reduced form of the index function I∗i is given
by
I∗i = δ(X2iβ2 −X1iβ1)− Ziγ + δ(ε2i − ε1i)− ηi = Z∗i γ∗ − ε∗, (22)
where Z∗i , γ
∗ and ε∗ are defined suitably. Define Ii = 1 if I∗ > 0 and
Ii = 0 otherwise. Based on the observations on Ii we can then use the
probit Maximum Likelihood estimator in the first step to obtain a consistent
estimate for the vector γ̂∗.
Wages in region 1 can be observed only for those individuals for whom
Ii = 0, and wages in region 2 only for those individuals for whom Ii = 1.
Estimating the wage equations therefore requires correction for this selec-
tion bias. Using the estimated vector of parameters γ̂∗, we can compute
the inverse Mills’ ratio for migrants and stayers as
φ(Z∗i bγ∗)
1−Φ(Z∗i bγ∗) and
φ(Z∗i bγ∗)
Φ(Z∗i bγ∗) , re-
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spectively. Under the normality assumptions, this allows us to correct for
selection bias and to estimate in the second step the wage equations for
stayers in the home region and movers to the host region by OLS:
ln wi = Xiβ1 − σ1ε∗ φ(Z
∗
i γ̂
∗)
Φ(Z∗i γ̂∗)
+ u1i, for Ii = 0, (23)
and
ln wi = Xiβ2 + σ2ε∗
φ(Z∗i γ̂
∗)
1− Φ(Z∗i γ̂∗)
+ u2i, for Ii = 1, (24)
which gives us consistent estimates of β1, β2, σ1ε∗ , and σ2ε∗ . Furthermore,
it is possible to derive consistent estimates for σ21 and σ
2
2 from the residuals
of the wage equations and estimated parameters (see Maddala, 1983, pp.
225-26). In our empirical application, we estimated the reduced form probit
model and each of the two Heckman selection equations in one step using
a maximum likelihood estimator (Greene, 1997). The ML function uses the
estimated parameters from the reduced form probit model as starting values
for the estimation of the Heckman corrected wage equations.
In the final step, we again use the probit model to estimate the structural
equation and to obtain a consistent estimate of δ, the coefficient of the wage
differential. Substituting ln ŵ1i = X1iβ̂1 and ln ŵ2i = X2iβ̂2 for lnw1i and ln
w2i, respectively, allows us to estimate the structural probit equation. As Lee
(1979) has demonstrated, the resulting estimates of γ and δ are consistent.
4 Data
We perform our empirical analysis of the self-selection of East-West migrants
in Germany using individual data from the “IAB-Regionalstichprobe”.2 This
data set contains a one per cent sample of all the returns of the social secu-
rity files of Germany, collected by the Federal Employment Services (Bun-
desanstalt für Arbeit). The East German sample starts at the beginning of
1992 and the last spells are reported for 1997.
The sample covers employed persons, unemployed persons and individuals
2Employee sample, regional file. The IAB-Regionalstichprobe is provided by the Ger-
man Institute for Employment Research (IAB) at the Federal Employment Services (Bun-
desanstalt für Arbeit). See Haas (2001) for a brief introduction.
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who are currently taking a break from employment. Self-employed persons
and those who are enrolled in educational programs are not included. More-
over, the sample is censored from above, i.e. individuals whose earnings
exceed the rather high ceiling for contributions to the public pension scheme
and unemployment insurance in Germany are not reported.3 In 1995, 86.2%
of the economically active population was captured by the social security
files in East Germany (Bender, Haas, and Klose, 2000, p. 3).
The observations of each individual are organised as event data. Every
change in the employment situation is collected with the date of its event,
but also every year a control return is registered. For each individual, work
history, personal characteristics, firm characteristics and regional details are
collected. We choose only individuals who are employed full-time on 31
March. The employment state on 31 March of every year is used to transform
the event-oriented data into a panel of yearly observations.
It is not trivial to identify East Germans in the data set. For the purpose
of our analysis, we define East Germans as follows: (i) they have their first
spell in 1992 or later, since East Germans were not included in the IAB
sample before; (ii) they are registered in an East German pension scheme4
if they are employed, and (iii) they work at a company in East Germany
if they are employed. These definitions imply that we do not include those
East Germans in our analysis who have migrated to West Germany before
1992.
On the basis of these definitions, we distinguish two groups of individ-
uals: stayers are all individuals that have been registered as employees or
unemployed in East Germany for the whole time span from 1992 to 1997 and
all individuals who are registered in East Germany, but will later move to
West Germany during the observed time period; movers are individuals who
are in a spell in the West for the first time, i.e. those who moved during the
previous year. Since our regressions are based on a cross-sectional analysis,
we do not consider the spells of East Germans who have been residing in
West Germany for more than two years. By definition, our sample contains
observations for stayers over the whole period from 1992 to 1997, for movers
3The ceiling was 5,300 DM in 1992 and 7,100 DM in 1997, while the mean incomes in
our sample amount to 2,695 and 3,097 for the two years.
4Landesversicherungsanstalt (LVA) Ost, Bundesversicherungsanstalt für Angestellte
(BfA) Ost, or Knappschaft.
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Table 1: Number of observations
year movers stayers perc. of movers
1994 428 33038 1.30
1995 380 33677 1.13
1996 389 32418 1.20
1997 364 30878 1.18
only from 1993 to 1997.
Table 1 shows that the number of individuals in our sample is slightly
declining. Some of the individuals may vanish from the sample due to death,
international migration, leaving the labour force or becoming unemployed.
Moreover, those who reside in West Germany for at least the second year van-
ish from the sample. Numerically, the highest number of movers is achieved
in 1994. In relative numbers, the share of movers diminishes only slightly
from 1.3% in 1994 to 1.2% in 1997.
5 Characteristics of East-West migrants
The following graphs provide some initial insights into the socio-economic
characteristics of East-West migrants. Summary statistics for all the vari-
ables used in our regressions for the individual years can be found in Table
11.
Figure 2 displays the development of the mean log of wages per day in
DM, divided into three groups: stayers and movers as defined above, and
a third category, called prospective movers. The last category contains all
individuals who are still in East Germany, but will move during the observa-
tion period. We include this third group here because the difference between
prospective movers and stayers is striking: wages of prospective movers start
well below those of stayers, although they receive much the same wage in-
crease as stayers. Note that the lower wage level may reflect the difference in
the age of stayers and migrants (see below). However, movers already work-
ing in West Germany receive wages above those of stayers in East Germany.
The descriptive statistics of the education variables seem to indicate that
East-West migrants are slightly less skilled than the average person in East
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Germany. We distinguish three groups by their highest education degree:
those who possess no vocational education degree, those who possess a voca-
tional education degree, and those who possess a degree from a university or
a university of applied sciences.5 Figure 3 displays the share of individuals
without vocational education degree in the groups of movers and stayers. The
share of unskilled is, at around seven per cent, relatively low in the group of
stayers, and shows a very strong decline in the group of movers (from around
15 to below 10 per cent).
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Figure 3: Mean of no vocational training degree
Figure 4 shows the individuals with completed vocational training, which
is the most common education group in East Germany. The share of indi-
viduals with completed vocational training is persistently high at around 74
5A fourth group, unknown or missing education, is used in the regressions, but we do
not display it here.
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per cent among the group of stayers, while the share in the group of movers
is rising from 60 to 70 per cent, with a spike in 1996.
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Figure 4: Mean of vocational training degree
Finally, we observe that the share of individuals with an academic edu-
cation degree is lower in the group of movers than in the group of stayers.
Note that, at around 11 per cent, the share of individuals with an academic
degree is relatively low in the East German population. While the share of
individuals with an academic degree is stable among the group of stayers,
we observe that it is increasing from 1995 onward (Figure 5). It is moreover
worth noting that our sample covers only individuals who have already par-
ticipated in the East German labour market, i.e. students and those with
an academic degree who take up their first job in West Germany are not
considered here. Moreover, individuals with a wage above the ceiling of the
social security records are not covered. These exclusions can heavily bias the
results with regard to high-skilled jobs.
To summarise, we observe that employed migrants are less skilled than
the sample average.
The difference in lagged unemployment rates of movers and stayers is
relatively stable with a difference of 10 to 15 percentage points, i.e. unem-
ployment seems to influence the migration decision strongly. Note that the
lagged unemployment rate is underreported in our sample, since we excluded
those who are unemployed in the present year. Thus, long-term unemployed
are not covered by our sample.
Over the whole time span, the mean age of movers is, at round 34 years,
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Figure 5: Mean of academic degree
persistently five years below the mean age of stayers (39 years). The age
increase is less than proportional, because young people are allowed to enter
the sample after 1992 if they start working in East Germany. Altogether, the
descriptive statistics confirm the hypothesis of the human capital theories of
migration that young people have a higher propensity to move.
The other personal characteristics show the following pattern (not dis-
played here): at the sample mean, the share of males among movers varies
between 62 and 71 per cent, while the share of males among the stayers is
constant at around 57 per cent. Moreover, there is a persistent difference in
the marital status of migrants and stayers: while around 57 per cent of the
stayers are married, only around 40 per cent of the movers are. Once again,
these results confirm a standard hypothesis from the human capital theory
of migration, i.e. that family ties affect the costs of migration.
6 Regression results
As has been outlined above, the estimation of the switching regression model
consists of three steps: firstly, we estimate a reduced form probit model in
order to obtain a consistent estimate of the individual probability to move.
The results from this estimate are used as starting values for a maximum-
likelihood estimation of a Heckit selection model of the wage equations for
East Germans in West and East Germany. In the final step, consistent es-
timates of the parameters in the wage equations are used for estimating a
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structural probit model which includes the estimated potential wage differ-
ential for each individual.
The explanatory variables are derived from the human capital theories of
migration (Sjaastad, 1961): Beyond the (expected) differential in wages it is
assumed that personal characteristics such as age, family ties and education
affect the costs and returns to migration, and, hence, the decision to migrate.
Moreover, following the traditional approach of Harris and Todaro (1970),
we assume that employment opportunities affect expected earnings.
The wage regressions have the traditional Mincer form, i.e. log wages
are explained by human capital variables such as education, age brackets,
gender, and by occupational status. We do not include marital status in
the wage regressions, since this variable is one of those used to identify the
model. This is possible because family status turned out not to be significant
in determining gross wages and should also not be correlated with the error
term of the wage regression.
Furthermore, branch dummies are included. In order to account for re-
gional and branch differences in economic prospects, we also include dummies
for the East German Federal States (Bundesländer) and branches. We do
not include the West German Bundesländer because we can not construct a
counterfactual for stayers, had they moved. The counterfactual Bundesland
of movers, had they stayed, is their Bundesland of origin.
Thus, in the wage regressions for East Germany, dummies for the home
region (Bundesland), dummies for the home industry branch and the lagged
unemployment rate are included. In the decision equation, we include the
lags of most variables in order to account for the fact that the decision to
migrate was made the year before, which implies that expectations have been
formed on basis of the explanatory variables of the past year.
6.1 Results from the Heckit regressions
We estimate four cross-sections for the years 1994 - 1997. The results of the
Heckman selection (’Heckit’) estimates are reported in Tables 3 to 6. The
coefficients of λ as reported in the tables are the covariances σ1ε∗ and σ2ε∗ , as
defined in the wage regressions for stayers and movers (Equations 6 and 7).
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Note that σ1ε∗ = ρ1ε∗σ1 and that σ2ε∗ = ρ2ε∗σ2, where ρ1ε∗ and ρ2ε∗ are the
correlation coefficients between the disturbances of the probit and the wage
equations. The values of these coefficients are also reported in Tables 3 to 6.
The signs of the estimated coefficients for ρ1ε∗ and ρ2ε∗ determine whether
the unobserved abilities of individuals are positively or negatively correlated
with the wage levels. We find in all four cross-sections that the sign of the
correlation coefficient is negative and significant for stayers, and positive
and significant for movers. Thus, this can be interpreted as strong evidence
that East-West migrants tend to be positively selected with respect to their
unobserved abilities. Although the positive selection bias varies somewhat in
the different cross-sections, we do not observe that the positive selection bias
disappears over time. Thus, the increasing inequality of earnings in Eastern
Germany do not seem to have affected the selection bias in our regressions.
The wage differential is calculated on the consistent estimate of wages
which are not biased by a selection effect (see Figure 6). If we take into
account the selection effect, the wage differential is much higher (see Figure
8). Note that this wage differential cannot be included in the probit regression
directly because of the huge difference among stayers and movers which would
produce a perfect prediction on who moves and who stays.
The education variables show the expected signs and have a stable effect
on wages in East Germany over time. The wage premium for individuals with
completed training over individuals without completed training amounts to
13 to 15 per cent. Individuals with a university degree get a wage premium
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sample selection
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of 37 to 42 per cent. The wage gap between no education and university
education amounts, then, to about 40 DM per day. Unknown education
also gets a wage premium over no education, but the premium is decreasing
over time (from 13.7 per cent to 8 per cent). In West Germany, unknown
education is not rewarded differently than no training. The wage premium
for university education is similar to East Germany with a higher volatility
of between 33 to 61 per cent. Also the premium of training is similar to East
Germany, but the trends of the curves are less smooth, possibly due to the
smaller sample size in West Germany.
Workers with completed vocational training receive four to seven per cent
higher wages than workers without completed training in East Germany, and
white collar workers and foremen receive the highest wages (between 30 and
40 per cent more than workers without vocational training). In West Ger-
many, we observe that only clerks and foremen earn significantly more than
the other two groups. Skilled workers get significantly more than unskilled
only in the years 1996 and 1997. The insignificant difference between skilled
and unskilled workers might be interpreted as evidence for a devaluation of
work-specific human capital.
With regard to the age effect on wages, there is again a difference between
movers and stayers. Stayers get a shrinking wage increase while moving
through the age brackets. This is consistent with the normal findings in wage
regressions where the coefficients for age are positive and the coefficients for
age squared are negative. From the age bracket 41-50 or latest from the age
bracket 51-64 onwards, the wage even decreases. For movers, the picture
is less smooth. The standard result of decreasing returns to age is also
observable, but there exists a dip in all the observed years with individuals
in their thirties getting lower wages than younger movers. Movers also get a
less steep wage increase than stayers, which can be explained by the missing
tenure of movers.
Men get consistently higher wages than women over time in East and
West Germany.
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6.2 Results from the probit estimates
The results of the reduced form probit regressions are reported in Tables 7 and
8, and of the structural form probit regressions in Tables 9 and 10. We show
only the results for the probability to move. The results for the probability
to stay can be derived from the results shown by just switching the sign
of the coefficients. In the first step (reduced form probit), one can observe
the overall effect of the explanatory variables. The effect is composed of the
direct effect and the indirect effect which goes through the wage differential.
In the second step (the structural probit), only the exogenous variables are
included. The variables which are expected to affect wages are excluded
because of collinearity between these variables and the wage differential.
The probit regressions explain the probability of an individual to work
in West Germany in year t instead of staying in East Germany and working
there. The explanatory variables refer to year t − 1, i.e. they measure
the status of a migrant or a stayer in East Germany the year before the
observation. We included once again only individuals who are employed in
year t. All regressions include a large number of individuals, of whom only
very few decide to migrate (see Table 1).
In the reduced form probit equation we observe some surprising results.
Regarding the education variables, we do not find a clear picture like those
found in other studies. None of our education variables turn out to be sig-
nificantly different from zero over time. Only two of the parameters are
significant at the ten percent level, but they do not bring any insights re-
garding the effects of education on the decision to migrate over time. We
conclude, therefore, that the education level does not affect the migration
decision of workers directly.
Regarding the occupational status, skilled workers tend to move less than
unskilled workers with significantly negative parameters from 1994 to 1996.
Also clerks and foremen are potentially less likely to move than workers with
no vocational training with only one significantly negative parameter in 1996.
The lagged unemployment rate exerts a very important impact on the
migration decision. We expected the effect of unemployment to be large
because we already observed in the descriptive analysis a huge difference in
the lagged unemployment rates of movers and stayers (see Section 5).
94
Among the personal characteristics, the marital status variable has the
expected significant negative effect on migration in almost all cross sections
(except 1995). The age brackets show a clear picture during the whole time
period. The cohorts with an age between 21 and 25 are most likely to move.
The oldest age group in the sample, i.e. the cohorts with an age from 51 to
64 years, have the highest propensity to stay in East Germany. All other age
groups behave like the reference category aged 17 to 21.
The other personal and family variables also show the expected results.
Males are significantly more likely to move, while married individuals are less
likely to move. The children dummy is not significant, perhaps due to the
fact that children are underreported in the social security records.6 Sector
and regional dummies do not show a clear pattern over time. Saxony is
the only exception which shows a significant attraction preventing workers
from moving to West Germany from 1995 onward. Mecklenburg-Western
Pomerania shows a significant positive effect in the structural probit only in
1994.
The wage differential has the expected positive sign in all four cross-
sections in the structural form probit estimates. The estimated effect of the
wage differential has to be interpreted as the minimum effect of the wage
differential, because we used the linear predictions not taking into account
the selection effect. If we consider the selection effect, the impact of the wage
differential would be much higher (see Graph 6).
The second important explanation for the decision to move is lagged
unemployment in the structural form probit estimates. This replicates the
results from the reduced form probit. It has a positive and highly signifi-
cant impact on the probability to move. Marital status now has significantly
negative effects in all years, while the dummy for children is still not signifi-
cant. The results for the home regions are also similar to the reduced form.
Thus, the economic variables in the structural probit regressions do have the
expected signs and are significant.
6The main reason for underreporting is that only one parent receives welfare benefits
from children (like Kindergeld, Kinderfreibetrag), such that the other parent appears as
childless in the social security records.
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Table 2: Employment and unemployment among stayers and movers
Stayers Movers
year employed unempl. percent employed unempl. percent
1994 33038 4574 13.8 428 51 11.9
1995 33677 4638 13.8 380 44 11.6
1996 32418 6502 20.1 389 82 21.1
1997 30878 6602 21.4 364 88 24.2
6.3 Comparison of Probit estimates with and without
unemployed
We have excluded the unemployed from our regressions, which may bias the
results if the unemployment rates in the group of movers and stayers and
their socio-economic characteristics differ. Table 2 displays the number of
employed and unemployed in the groups of movers and stayers. The figures
show very similar unemployment rates in both groups. The difference in the
characteristics are not displayed here. However, including the unemployed
in the probit regressions does not change the results much: the parameters
have a similar size and we observe the same pattern of significance.7 Thus,
we can conclude that the exclusion of the unemployed has not affected our
results.
7 Conclusion
East Germany inherited from central planning greater equality in the dis-
tribution of earnings, but the inequality in earnings has almost approached
West German levels in less than ten years since the beginning of transition.
The standard Roy model predicts that migrants are favourably selected if
the variance of earnings is higher in the host region than in the home region
and if the correlation between earnings in both regions is sufficiently strong.
Thus, we can derive from the Roy model the hypothesis that migrants from
East Germany should have been favourably selected in the beginning, but
that the selection bias should have disappeared over time.
7The results are available from the authors upon request.
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Our findings do not confirm this hypothesis. We analysed the self-
selection of East-West migrants in Germany on basis of a switching regres-
sion model. The results from our selection regressions provide strong evi-
dence that migrants from East Germany are positively selected with regard
to unobserved abilities. Thus, migrants tend to earn more than their staying
counterparts if we control for observable human capital characteristics. East-
West migrants do, however, remain positively selected over time although the
inequality in the distribution in East Germany has substantially increased.
This result clearly contradicts the predictions of the standard Roy model.
However, if we relax the assumptions of the standard model and consider
moving costs which are negatively correlated with abilities relevant for the
labour market performance of individuals, then a persistent positive selection
bias is in line with the theoretical expectations resulting from an extended
Roy model. Nevertheless, our results should be interpreted with caution,
since our sample covers only five years.
In contrast to studies based on other data sources, we do not find that
individuals with higher education degrees tend to have a higher propensity to
migrate. Conversely, the descriptive statistics in our data set show that skill
levels of the migrants are below those of the average person who remains
in East Germany. Moreover, we do not find in our reduced form probit
regressions any significant impact of education on the propensity to migrate.
This holds true for the whole time period covered by our sample. However,
these results can be traced back at least partly to the fact that an important
group of high-skilled migrants, students and individuals with an academic
degree who started their working career in West Germany, is not included in
our sample.
Interestingly enough, we find a negative correlation between occupational
status and migration probabilities in our reduced form probit regressions. We
interpret this as an indication that occupational status is at least partly lost
by moving from the East to the West, i.e. that migrants are only partly
able to transfer their work experience and firm-specific human capital to the
West.
The wage differential shows a strong positive impact on the propensity
to migrate in our structural probit estimates. Moreover, an unemployment
event in the period preceding migration turns out to be highly significant.
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These findings are in contrast to parts of the empirical literature based on
individual data sets which do not control for selection bias of migrants. Thus,
the results from our switching regression estimates reconcile some of the
paradoxical findings in the empirical literature on the impact of wages and
other key economic variables on East-West migration in Germany.
Finally, the results from our probit regressions confirm some standard
findings from the human capital theories of migration: the propensity to
migrate declines with age, married individuals tend to migrate less than
unmarried, and males tend to migrate more than females.
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Löhne und Weiterbildung: Warum pendeln Ostdeutsche in den Westen,”
in Arbeitsmarktdynamik und Unternehmensentwicklung in Ostdeutschland,
ed. by H. König, and V. Steiner. Nomos.
Roy, A. D. (1951): “Some Thoughts on the Distribution of Earnings,”
Oxford Economic Papers, 3, 135 – 146.
Schwarze, J. (1996): “Beeinflusst das Lohngefälle zwischen Ost- und West-
deutschland das Migrationsverhalten der Ostdeuschen?,” Allgemeines Sta-
tistisches Archiv, 80, 50 – 68.
100
Sjaastad, L. (1961): “The Costs and Returns of Human Migration,” Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 70, 80 – 93.
Willis, R., and S. Rosen (1979): “Education and Self-Selection,” Journal
of Political Economy, 87, S7 – S36.
101
Table 3: Heckit East German Wages 1994-95 with Selection: Stayer
Variable Coeff.94 (Std.Err.) Coeff.95 (Std.Err.)
Dependent variable: log(wage)
With training 0.149∗∗ (0.008) 0.130∗∗ (0.008)
University or UAS 0.395∗∗ (0.010) 0.400∗∗ (0.010)
Unknown education 0.137∗∗ (0.009) 0.102∗∗ (0.010)
Skilled workers 0.052∗∗ (0.006) 0.058∗∗ (0.006)
Clerks and foremen 0.354∗∗ (0.006) 0.371∗∗ (0.006)
Age 21-25 0.494∗∗ (0.012) 0.512∗∗ (0.013)
Age 26-30 0.597∗∗ (0.012) 0.618∗∗ (0.013)
Age 31-35 0.638∗∗ (0.012) 0.659∗∗ (0.012)
Age 36-40 0.655∗∗ (0.012) 0.685∗∗ (0.012)
Age 41-45 0.660∗∗ (0.012) 0.688∗∗ (0.012)
Age 46-50 0.662∗∗ (0.012) 0.684∗∗ (0.013)
Age 51-64 0.665∗∗ (0.011) 0.679∗∗ (0.012)
Sex 0.226∗∗ (0.004) 0.240∗∗ (0.004)
Brandenburg 0.043∗∗ (0.006) 0.055∗∗ (0.006)
Meck.-W. Pom 0.032∗∗ (0.006) 0.034∗∗ (0.006)
Saxony -0.001 (0.005) 0.008 (0.005)
Saxony-Anhalt 0.017∗∗ (0.006) 0.019∗∗ (0.006)
Agric., Cons. Goods -0.055∗∗ (0.005) -0.042∗∗ (0.005)
Goods Production -0.005 (0.005) 0.033∗∗ (0.005)
Constr., transport -0.093∗∗ (0.005) 0.079∗∗ (0.005)
Intercept 3.443∗∗ (0.011) 3.453∗∗ (0.012)
ρ1ε∗ -0.845
∗∗ (0.012) -0.877∗∗ (0.010)
σ1 0.301
∗∗ (0.001) 0.311∗∗ (0.001)
λ -0.255∗∗ (0.004) -0.273∗∗ (0.004)
N 33466 34057
N cens. 428 380
Log-likelihood -8465.171 -9478.105
χ2(20) 25372.17 25473.09
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Reference category: No training, Unskilled worker, Female, Not married, Thuringia,
Building and construction
All variables except ln(wage) refer to the year before
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Table 4: Heckit East German Wages 1996-97 with Selection: Stayer
Variable Coeff.96 (Std.Err.) Coeff.97 (Std.Err.)
Dependent variable: log(wage)
With training 0.151∗∗ (0.009) 0.143∗∗ (0.009)
University or UAS 0.412∗∗ (0.011) 0.415∗∗ (0.011)
Unknown education 0.104∗∗ (0.010) 0.082∗∗ (0.010)
Skilled workers 0.054∗∗ (0.006) 0.069∗∗ (0.006)
Clerks and foremen 0.378∗∗ (0.006) 0.392∗∗ (0.007)
Age 21-25 0.519∗∗ (0.014) 0.516∗∗ (0.014)
Age 26-30 0.663∗∗ (0.013) 0.671∗∗ (0.013)
Age 31-35 0.707∗∗ (0.013) 0.713∗∗ (0.013)
Age 36-40 0.733∗∗ (0.013) 0.739∗∗ (0.013)
Age 41-45 0.747∗∗ (0.013) 0.768∗∗ (0.013)
Age 46-50 0.722∗∗ (0.013) 0.743∗∗ (0.013)
Age 51-64 0.718∗∗ (0.013) 0.733∗∗ (0.013)
Sex 0.250∗∗ (0.004) 0.250∗∗ (0.004)
Brandenburg 0.048∗∗ (0.006) 0.045∗∗ (0.006)
Meck.-W. Pom. 0.036∗∗ (0.007) 0.030∗∗ (0.007)
Saxony 0.006 (0.005) 0.001 (0.006)
Saxony-Anhalt 0.019∗∗ (0.006) 0.019∗∗ (0.006)
Agric., Cons. Goods -0.035∗∗ (0.006) -0.036∗∗ (0.006)
Goods Production 0.050∗∗ (0.006) 0.062∗∗ (0.006)
Constr., transport 0.076∗∗ (0.005) 0.072∗∗ (0.005)
Intercept 3.408∗∗ (0.012) 3.405∗∗ (0.012)
ρ1ε∗ -0.918
∗∗ (0.007) -0.919∗∗ (0.008)
σ1 0.319
∗∗ (0.001) 0.322∗∗ (0.001)
λ -0.293∗∗ (0.003) -0.296∗∗ (0.003)
N 32807 31242
N cens. 389 364
Log-likelihood -9893.626 -9739.047
χ2(18) 26672.68 26377.80
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Reference category: No training, Unskilled worker, Female, Not married, Thuringia,
Building and Construction
All variables except ln(wage) refer to the year before
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Table 5: Heckit West German Wages 1994-95 with Selection: Mover
Variable Coeff.94 (Std.Err.) Coeff.95 (Std.Err.)
Dependent variable: log(wage)
With training 0.198∗∗ (0.055) 0.098† (0.060)
University or UAS 0.613∗∗ (0.094) 0.334∗∗ (0.113)
Unknown education 0.094 (0.061) 0.055 (0.066)
Skilled workers -0.019 (0.050) 0.074 (0.049)
Clerks and foremen 0.200∗∗ (0.051) 0.354∗∗ (0.053)
Age 21-25 0.196∗ (0.082) 0.196† (0.088)
Age 26-30 0.153† (0.083) 0.158∗ (0.091)
Age 31-35 0.107 (0.085) 0.331∗∗ (0.089)
Age 36-40 0.193∗ (0.091) 0.315∗∗ (0.091)
Age 41-45 0.099 (0.088) 0.220∗ (0.095)
Age 46-50 0.247∗∗ (0.096) 0.335∗∗ (0.103)
Age 51-64 0.240∗ (0.097) 0.183† (0.103)
Sex 0.260∗∗ (0.046) 0.243∗∗ (0.044)
Agric., Cons. Goods -0.033 (0.057) 0.049 (0.060)
Goods Production 0.095† (0.052) 0.264∗∗ (0.066)
Constr., transport 0.114∗ (0.048) 0.159∗∗ (0.043)
Intercept 3.548∗∗ (0.171) 3.694∗∗ (0.185)
ρ1ε∗ 0.529
∗∗ (0.230) 0.313† (0.182)
σ1 0.387
∗∗ (0.058) 0.340∗∗ (0.022)
λ 0.205∗∗ (0.118) 0.106 (0.068)
N 34198 35020
N cens. 33779 34654
Log-likelihood -2263.904 -1999.873
χ2(16) 165.00 170.80
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Reference category: No training, Unskilled worker, Female, Not married, Thuringia,
Building and Construction
All variables except ln(wage) refer to the year before
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Table 6: Heckit West German Wages 1996-97 Selection: Mover
Variable Coeff.96 (Std.Err.) Coeff.97 (Std.Err.)
Dependent variable: log(wage)
With training 0.171∗∗ (0.053) 0.037 (0.068)
University or UAS 0.352∗∗ (0.094) 0.430∗∗ (0.098)
Unknown education 0.083 (0.056) -0.010 (0.072)
Skilled workers 0.076† (0.044) 0.181∗∗ (0.052)
Clerks and foremen 0.337∗∗ (0.043) 0.466∗∗ (0.054)
Age 21-25 0.263∗∗ (0.089) 0.185† (0.101)
Age 26-30 0.291∗∗ (0.089) 0.257∗∗ (0.100)
Age 31-35 0.351∗∗ (0.089) 0.274∗∗ (0.100)
Age 36-40 0.265∗∗ (0.090) 0.254∗ (0.103)
Age 41-45 0.268∗∗ (0.095) 0.224∗ (0.108)
Age 46-50 0.275∗∗ (0.098) 0.266∗ (0.109)
Age 51-64 0.312∗∗ (0.095) 0.299∗∗ (0.111)
Sex 0.285∗∗ (0.040) 0.254∗∗ (0.044)
Agric., Cons. Goods 0.047 (0.059) -0.081 (0.067)
Goods Production 0.117∗ (0.053) 0.161∗∗ (0.058)
Constr., transport 0.121∗∗ (0.039) 0.175∗∗ (0.049)
Intercept 3.525∗∗ (0.174) 3.646∗∗ (0.205)
ρ1ε∗ 0.477
∗∗ (0.143) 0.359† (0.191)
σ1 0.325
∗∗ (0.027) 0.332∗∗ (0.026)
λ 0.155∗∗ (0.058) 0.119† (0.071)
N 33512 31886
N cens. 33127 31526
Log-likelihood -2034.372 -1939.869
χ2(16) 204.42 268.25
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Reference category: No training, Unskilled worker, Female, Not married, Thuringia,
Building and Construction
All variables except ln(wage) refer to the year before
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Table 7: Probit first step 1994-1995
Variable Coeff.94 (Std.Err.) Coeff.95 (Std.Err.)
With training -0.002 (0.080) -0.128† (0.084)
University or UAS -0.068 (0.110) -0.156 (0.140)
Unknown education 0.008 (0.095) -0.144 (0.095)
Skilled workers -0.159∗ (0.063) -0.152∗ (0.068)
Clerks and foremen -0.104 (0.067) -0.085 (0.072)
Unemployed 0.640∗∗ (0.078) 0.587∗∗ (0.064)
Age 21-25 0.216∗ (0.108) 0.355∗∗ (0.016)
Age 26-30 0.013 (0.114) 0.046 (0.016)
Age 31-35 -0.141 (0.115) -0.014 (0.016)
Age 36-40 -0.239∗ (0.119) -0.071 (0.016)
Age 41-45 -0.175 (0.118) -0.097 (0.016)
Age 46-50 -0.211† (0.126) -0.188 (0.016)
Age 51-64 -0.408∗∗ (0.121) -0.377∗∗ (0.016)
Sex 0.207∗∗ (0.048) 0.191∗∗ (0.055)
Marital status -0.129∗∗ (0.045) -0.057 (0.051)
Children 0.020 (0.094) 0.076 (0.051)
Agric., Cons.Goods -0.120† (0.063) -0.048 (0.122)
Goods Production -0.008 (0.058) 0.022 (0.078)
Construct., Trans. -0.064 (0.055) 0.016 (0.094)
Brandenburg 0.112† (0.065) -0.024 (0.071)
Meck.-W. Pom. 0.101 (0.071) 0.005 (0.077)
Saxony -0.080 (0.062) -0.193∗∗ (0.065)
Saxony-Anhalt 0.057 (0.065) -0.093 (0.071)
Intercept -2.111∗∗ (0.106) -2.137∗∗ (0.266)
N 34207 35034
Log-likelihood -2160.126 -1944.478
χ2(23) 305.073 260.177
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Reference category: No training, Unskilled worker, Female, Not married, Thuringia,
Building and Construction
All variables except ln(wage) refer to the year before
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Table 8: Probit first step 1996-1997
Variable Coeff.96 (Std.Err.) Coeff.97 (Std.Err.)
With training 0.005 (0.086) -0.032 (0.088)
University or UAS -0.007 (0.119) 0.078 (0.117)
Unknown education 0.176† (0.098) 0.113 (0.100)
Skilled workers -0.134∗ (0.063) -0.097 (0.068)
Clerks and foremen -0.127† (0.068) -0.073 (0.072)
Unemployed 0.476∗∗ (0.074) 0.455∗∗ (0.070)
Age 21-25 0.359∗∗ (0.128) 0.395∗∗ (0.127)
Age 26-30 0.246† (0.135) 0.207 (0.137)
Age 31-35 0.169 (0.135) -0.002 (0.139)
Age 36-40 0.082 (0.138) -0.052 (0.141)
Age 41-45 -0.084 (0.143) -0.168 (0.144)
Age 46-50 -0.023 (0.146) -0.128 (0.146)
Age 51-64 -0.157 (0.141) -0.298∗ (0.145)
Sex 0.193∗∗ (0.050) 0.137∗∗ (0.050)
Marital status -0.179∗∗ (0.047) -0.091† (0.050)
Children 0.125 (0.089) 0.081 (0.088)
Agric., Cons. Goods -0.141∗ (0.070) -0.199∗∗ (0.074)
Goods Production -0.183∗∗ (0.071) -0.069 (0.066)
Constr., Transp. 0.056 (0.054) -0.082 (0.058)
Brandenburg -0.195∗∗ (0.065) -0.033 (0.066)
Meck.-W. Pom. -0.195∗∗ (0.073) -0.033 (0.072)
Saxony -0.261∗∗ (0.057) -0.205∗∗ (0.061)
Saxony-Anhalt -0.130∗ (0.062) -0.139∗ (0.068)
Intercept -2.169∗∗ (0.119) -2.142∗∗ (0.118)
N 33516 31890
Log-likelihood -1982.069 -1865.945
χ2(23) 276.253 248.205
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Reference category: No training, Unskilled worker, Female, Not married,
Thuringia, Building and Construction
All variables except ln(wage) refer to the year before
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Table 9: Probability to move 1994-1995, structural results
Variable Coeff.94 (Std.Err.) Coeff.95 (Std.Err.)
Unemployed 0.658∗∗ (0.074) 0.589∗∗ (0.068)
Wage differential 0.553∗∗ (0.186) 0.327∗ (0.151)
Marital status -0.248∗∗ (0.044) -0.242∗∗ (0.043)
Children 0.004 (0.044) 0.068 (0.083)
Brandenburg 0.141∗ (0.072) -0.034 (0.066)
Meck.-W. Pom. 0.119† (0.078) 0.024 (0.070)
Saxony -0.081 (0.067) -0.210∗∗ (0.060)
Saxony-Anhalt 0.060 (0.072) -0.094 (0.065)
Intercept -2.017∗∗ (0.133) -2.129∗∗ (0.052)
N 33457 34043
Log-likelihood -2163.287 -1938.589
χ2(8) 176.718 168.843
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Reference category: Employed, Not married, no children, Thuringia
All variables except the wage differential refer to the year before
Table 10: Probability to move 1996-1997, structural results
Variable Coeff.96 (Std.Err.) Coeff.97 (Std.Err.)
Unemployed 0.471∗∗ (0.072) 0.482∗∗ (0.067)
Wage differential 0.406∗ (0.163) 0.144 (0.162)
Marital status -0.299∗∗ (0.043) -0.281∗∗ (0.044)
Children 0.140 (0.086) 0.068 (0.085)
Brandenburg -0.154∗ (0.065) -0.017 (0.066)
Meck.-W. Pom. -0.157∗ (0.071) -0.008 (0.071)
Saxony -0.259∗∗ (0.057) -0.210∗∗ (0.061)
Saxony-Anhalt -0.133∗ (0.061) -0.126† (0.067)
Intercept -1.930∗∗ (0.054) -2.083∗∗ (0.055)
N 32803 31238
Log-likelihood -2012.15 -1894.15
χ2(8) 163.838 141.101
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Reference category: Employed, Not married, no children, Thuringia
All variables except the wage differential refer to the year before
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Table 11: Summary 94-97
Variable Mean94 Mean95 Mean96 Mean97
log(wage) 4.565 4.608 4.627 4.637
(0.397) (0.408) (0.425) (0.434)
Age 17-20 0.029 0.028 0.030 0.031
Age 21-25 0.079 0.080 0.075 0.071
Age 26-30 0.123 0.113 0.105 0.102
Age 31-35 0.158 0.156 0.154 0.148
Age 36-40 0.157 0.155 0.154 0.156
Age 41-45 0.154 0.159 0.157 0.155
Age 46-50 0.101 0.099 0.113 0.129
Age 51-64 0.198 0.211 0.211 0.207
Male 0.580 0.576 0.565 0.563
Mover Dummy 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.011
Unemployed 0.042 0.067 0.061 0.080
Marital status 0.558 0.565 0.571 0.574
Children 0.047 0.059 0.053 0.059
Without training 0.080 0.083 0.082 0.086
With training 0.743 0.733 0.733 0.729
UAS or University degree 0.110 0.107 0.106 0.104
Unknown education 0.076 0.077 0.079 0.081
Trainees and unskilled 0.152 0.163 0.164 0.168
Skilled workers 0.382 0.375 0.369 0.365
Clerks and foremen 0.465 0.462 0.467 0.467
Brandenburg 0.181 0.179 0.177 0.176
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 0.123 0.123 0.124 0.125
Saxony 0.337 0.338 0.339 0.344
Saxony-Anhalt 0.195 0.194 0.193 0.193
Thuringia 0.164 0.166 0.167 0.163
Agriculture, Consumption Goods 0.155 0.145 0.138 0.137
Goods Production 0.161 0.149 0.146 0.146
Construction, Transport 0.210 0.225 0.226 0.225
Trade, Services 0.473 0.481 0.489 0.492
Number of observations 34207 35034 33516 31889
No. of obs. lnwage 33457 34043 32803 31238
All variables except ln(wage) refer to the year before
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Nutritional efficiency wages in Côte
d’Ivoire
Abstract
It is generally accepted that people have to eat in order to be able
to do their work. On the other hand, the wage or production out-
put enables them to subsist. This circle has been investigated from
different points of view, as different policy implications arise from
the possible relations between nutritional status and ability to work.
Economists have shown theoretically that better nutrition increases
productivity and that there is a threshold of the nutritional status
below which people are not able to produce the equivalent to their
subsistence wages. This implies that help for the poorest of the pop-
ulation has to improve their nutritional status directly (for example
through (re)distribution of land or food) to enable them to work. I am
looking into the empirical relationship between nutrition (Body Mass
Index) and wages using the Côte d’Ivoire Living Standards Survey
(CILSS) from 1985 to 88. I find that the probability to earn wages
depends as predicted by theory on the Body Mass Index as a short-
run indicator of nutrition and on body height as a long-run indicator.
The probability to work is not dependent on the nutritional status, but
on non-labour income, which theory also interprets as a productivity
enhancing factor.
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1 Introduction
The first of the international development goals that have been defined at the
millennium summit is to “eradicate extreme poverty and hunger”. All United
Nations Member states have pledged to meet the goals that should be reached
by 2015 and comprise changes in poverty, education, gender inequality etc.
The first goal to reduce extreme poverty is divided into the goal to halve the
proportion of people whose income is less than $1 a day from 1990 to 2015
and into the goal to halve the proportion of people starving (for details see
United Nations (2000)).
The international organisations show in their report that especially in
Sub-Saharan Africa, the path of development out of poverty is by far not
enough to reach the goal to halve poverty from 1990 to 2015 (IMF, OECD,
United Nations, and World Bank, 2000). Africa has by far the worst starting
position and the progress out of poverty is almost not existent. The pro-
portion of people living on less than 1$ a day went down from 48 to 46% in
Sub-saharan Africa, while in the second worst region, South Asia, the drop
was from 44 to 40%. All other regions do have much lower poverty numbers.
Only when the causes for poverty and hunger in Sub-saharan Africa are
identified, policy measures can be designed to successfully fight against them.
One theoretical explanation for the persistence of poverty is formulated in
the efficiency wage theory first introduced by Leibenstein (1957). Efficiency
wages are wages above the market clearing wage and induce involuntary
unemployment. While in developed countries efficiency wages are paid to
prevent workers from shirking (when information is imperfect), efficiency
wages in developing countries are necessary for the workers to maintain their
productivity. Workers in developing countries are expected to be so under-
nourished from the beginning that firms maximising profit arrive at paying
a wage level above the equilibrium.
The influence of the nutritional status on productivity and thus on the
ability to gain wages was explained theoretically by several models, but the
empirical evidence is nevertheless less conclusive. For the empirical test of
the efficiency wage theory, a developing country like Côte d’Ivoire can be
used. Even if Côte d’Ivoire has to be seen as a high-wage country among
the members of the West-African currency union and one of the most indus-
trialised countries among the sub-Saharan countries, poverty remains very
high. For an overview of the economic indicators of Côte d’Ivoire over the
time span under consideration see Table 7 in the Appendix.
In Table 1, two measures of Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) are
displayed to show the extent of poverty in the regions of Côte d’Ivoire for
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the years 1985 to 1988. The measures are calculated with the formula
Pα =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
z − xi
z
]α
where n is the population size, z is the poverty line, xi is the expenditure
of individual i. With rising α, poverty gaps are higher penalised. With α
being zero, the measure corresponds to the head count ratio, which is the
share of individuals living below the poverty line. The α = 2 measure is used
most frequently, because it takes the distribution among poor into account
(Deaton, 1997). As the poverty line, 128,600 CFAF per year is chosen. This
line is defined so that 30% of the population fell below that line at 1985
Abidjan Prices (World Bank, 1997).
The headcount measure P0 in Table 1 shows a slight increase in poverty
from 1985 to 88 for Côte d’Ivoire with widely varying numbers among the
five regions. While in Abidjan, the biggest agglomeration in the country, the
poverty rate is relatively low, but rising over time, poverty in the two least
developed regions East Forest and Savannah, is persistently high over time.
The measure P2 shows that poverty in Côte d’Ivoire went down in the three
rural areas from 85 to 86, but afterwards it increased, too. The table shows
that if we take into account the average per capita expenditure of the poor
and the distribution of expenditures among the poor (use P2 instead of P0),
the poverty increase is moderated.
Table 1: Poverty measures by region and year
1985 1986 1987 1988
P0 P2 P0 P2 P0 P2 P0 P2
Côte d’Ivoire 0.300 0.045 0.299 0.032 0.348 0.043 0.459 0.063
Abidjan 0.034 0.004 0.166 0.012 0.074 0.009 0.139 0.006
Other Cities 0.236 0.037 0.223 0.024 0.224 0.019 0.410 0.040
East Forest 0.479 0.069 0.395 0.045 0.435 0.041 0.494 0.062
West Forest 0.178 0.013 0.200 0.013 0.376 0.043 0.553 0.064
Savannah 0.502 0.088 0.481 0.058 0.578 0.093 0.652 0.131
Poverty Line: 128,600 CFAF/year, Source: Grootaert (1993)
Table 2 shows the dynamics of poverty and the probabilities of individ-
uals to move out of or into poverty. The advantage of measuring poverty
changes on the household level and not on the economy-wide or regional
level is that changes in poverty of the same individuals are measured. Thus,
measuring poverty on the individual level gives a more precise picture on
poverty changes. Grootaert and Kanbur (1993a) do not only use the poverty
line of 128,600 CFAF/year that defines 30% of the population of 1985 as
poor, but a second poverty line of 75,000 CFAF/year to indicate very poor
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individuals. With the latter poverty line, 10% of the population of 1985 are
declared as very poor. In Table 2, the probability to move from one poverty
class to another is displayed, with classes being defined as very poor, poor
and non-poor. In the first line, one can see that poverty in the panel is a
little less than the higher poverty percentage of the two corresponding cross-
sections in the first line of Table 1. In detail, the values do not tell a positive
story about the years in consideration. The probability to move into a worse
poverty class is much higher then the probability to move upwards. In the
second two panels, even the descent into the very poor category is much more
probable than the ascent out of the very poor category.
Table 2: Probability to be poor
Poverty in Panels 85/86 86/87 87/88
Prob. to be poor in panel 28.1 26.7 40.1
Prob. to stay in poverty class 74.4 73 69.1
Prob. to improve poverty class 12.6 8.5 6.3
Prob. to worsen poverty class 12.7 18.5 24.5
Prob. to improve from very poor 5.7 1.2 2.1
Prob. to worsen to very poor 2.2 5.1 9.2
Source: Grootaert and Kanbur (1993a), own calculations
The development goals seek to induce an amelioration in poverty and
hunger; theory tells that a better nutrition leads to a higher productivity
meaning higher income. If the theory on nutritional efficiency wages holds, a
policy on generating income would not help the very poor to flee unemploy-
ment and find gainful employment. The theoretically most efficient policy
should ameliorate the nutritional status of the unemployed so that they would
be able to work productively. The goal of better nutrition for the poor could
for example be reached by providing them with land. The generated nutri-
tion effect from the cultivation of the land would then enable the poor to
work more productively in a job and flee the vicious circle of unemployment
and undernutrition.
In this paper I try to investigate the phenomenon of nutritional efficiency
wages and nutritional poverty traps. For the investigation I use a rotating
panel data set of Côte d’Ivoire over the years 1985 to 1988. The data set is
one among very few panel data sets that exist for developing countries and
it has a wide variety of questions relevant to my investigation. Furthermore,
the data set is on a country that has a huge number of poor people and is
thus suited for our purpose. After presenting theory and the data in more
detail, I will estimate the influence of nutrition on employment and wages.
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2 Theory
The basis to all the theories on nutritional efficiency wages is the energy
balance equation. As poor people cannot afford to buy enough food, they
are undernourished and their work capacity is affected. Energy balance is
only ensured when energy input (w) is equal to energy use. Energy use
consists of the resting metabolism (r), the work performance (q) and an
increase or decrease of stocks as the balancing factor (b). This relation of
the flow measures can be written as:
w = r + q + b, (1)
The effort h that an individual can put into his work is q + b, but if b is
smaller than zero, the individual will use his reserves and will not be able to
maintain the work effort over a longer time. That can be seen in the stock
equation.
The nutrition stock m in (t + 1) as for example measured by the BMI is
only changed by the balancing factor, so the stock equation can be written
as:
mt+1 = mt + bt. (2)
If an individual puts too much effort into his work, the nutritional stock
will decrease over time, so that he will starve. Nutritional efficiency wages
can be derived from these equations. They result from the capacity curve
which illustrates the relation between the income w that is - according to
assumptions - spent only on nutrition and the resulting work capacity (or
output) h:
w = h(w − r), (3)
At very low income levels, nutrition is used only for sustaining the rest-
ing metabolism r and not for increasing the work capacity. h and w do not
any more show a linear relationship as in equation 1, because h depends
now on w and r: With rising income work capacity rises more than propor-
tionately; at very high incomes, capacity rises under-proportionately or even
decreases. The curve is depicted in Figure 1. The nutritional efficiency wage
w∗ is defined as the wage level that has to be paid in order to receive an
adequate work capacity and thus to be able to produce the desired output.
The equilibrium wage will be explained in detail in the following chapter.
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The labour supply function can be derived by combining the capacity
curve with different wages. The labour demand function is not continuous,
but has a gap because of the special form of the capacity curve. If the labour
demand function crosses the supply curve in this gap, the equilibrium wage is
hard to determine. The equilibrium only exists, if unemployment is possible.
In this situation, supply is greater than demand, but the wage cannot adjust
downwards to dispose of unemployment. At a lower wage level, it is not
possible to offer the same work capacity. Wages are thus determined by the
nutritional situation, not by supply and demand (for further details see Ray
(1998, Ch. 13)).
Putting efficiency wages in a dynamic setting, the dependency of the work
capacity and wages can lead to a vicious circle. A relatively high labour
supply leads to low wages that are in a range where they influence the work
capacity. An undernourished individual will not be able to offer work on this
wage level because of his low productivity. Once an individual is unemployed,
the probability to find a job decreases, because he lives on his reserves and
becomes more and more undernourished. In the next period, he would need
even higher wages. The situation leads to the existence of poverty traps and
is theoretically described by Dasgupta (1997). I will show the details of the
model in section 2.2.
2.1 A Static Model
Mirrlees (1975) and Stiglitz (1976) developed an efficiency wage model that
can be applied to developing countries. The main assumption for the model
in order to be valid is that the workers are reliant on their wages in order
to insure their nutrition. They also have to use the bulk of their income for
food. The idea is that individuals need a certain amount of food in order
to maintain their resting metabolism as it has been described by equation
1. A wage that cannot deliver this amount of food cannot be accepted by
any worker. With increasing wages the productivity of a worker will increase
more than proportionately up to a point when the increase will only be less
than proportionate.
To model the relation between nutrition and productivity, the authors
introduce efficiency hours in contrast to clock hours; whereas the first mea-
sures the productivity of the workers, the last the actual hours. Workers
being more productive produce a higher amount of efficiency hours during
the same amount of clock hours. The amount of efficiency hours (h) produced
per clock hour depends on the consumption of the worker: h(c).
The number of hours worked per day is denoted by l and the whole wage
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w is consumed (w = c), so that the number of efficiency hours worked per
day is l ·h(w). I can then calculate the wage per efficiency hour from the daily
wage w as w/h(w). This corresponds to the costs of the employer for one
efficiency hour of work. The output is dependent on the number of efficiency
hours and can be denoted as y = f [l · h(w)].
To derive the efficiency wage which corresponds to the equilibrium wage
w*, one can consider three variants of the model. I will follow the argumen-
tation of Bliss and Stern (1978) in the following model description where not
otherwise specified. Bliss and Stern (1978) model the relation between pro-
ductivity, wages and nutrition. They assume that there exists a monopsony
on the labour demand side. In the first variant, only landless workers supply
work, in the second variant, landless workers and workers with land coexist,
but they supply labour in two different labour markets, and finally in the
third variant, both kinds of workers exist and compete in the same market.
In all these variants, a monopsony on the labour demand side is supposed
and will be abolished only in a further step. With a competitive demand
side, the outcome of the model changes.
0 w*r
w
h
h(w)
Figure 1: Wage capacity curve
Nutritional efficiency wages result from the work capacity curve which
shows the relation between income being spent only on nutrition and output
of a worker. The wage-productivity curve shown in Figure 1 starts at a
positive wage assuming that a worker needs a certain level of consumption
to be able to provide labour. The curve is then rising at an increasing rate,
which means that at low levels of income, there is a huge effect of better
nutrition on efficiency. From a certain level onwards there are decreasing
returns to scale. The equilibrium of the model is at the point where the
marginal productivity equals the average productivity, the equilibrium wage
is thus w∗.
Up to this point, Bliss and Stern (1978) used the model of Mirrlees (1975)
and Stiglitz (1976), but they have since then developed three different vari-
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ants of the model.
2.1.1 First variant of the model: only landless workers
In the first variant of the model only landless workers supply labour in the
labour market. Workers use wages w (at least to a high and fixed share) for
consumption of food. The (only) employer minimises his costs, given that he
produces at least the output y.
The minimisation problem faced by the employer can be written as:
min
w,l
w · l (4)
subject to
f [l · h(w)] ≥ y
where [l · h(w)] is the number of efficiency hours worked per day. Thus,
the employer minimises his wage bill subject to producing at least output y.
Minimising Equation 4 subject to the restriction results in the equilibrium
wage w∗:
w∗ = h(w)/h′(w) (5)
Equation 5 shows that the employer pays a wage which minimises the
average costs for an efficiency hour. This wage is called efficiency wage and
is indicated as w* in Figure 1. w∗ is defined by the point where the tangent
to the capacity curve goes through the origin. Because of the structure of the
work capacity curve there can be unemployment without driving the wage
downwards to an equilibrium without unemployment in the labour market.
2.1.2 Second variant of the model: landless workers and workers
with land, two separate labour markets
In this variant, there are both workers owning land (Type 0) and landless
workers (Type 1). Furthermore, there exist two employers, each of whom
can employ workers either with or without land.
Type 1 workers will split their time between working on their own land
and for the employer so that their consumption (welfare) is maximised. This
is the case when marginal productivity of efficiency hours on their own land
and opportunity costs of efficiency hours being worked for the employer are
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equal. Labour supply is equal to labour demand, because Type 1 worker’s
maximisation of consumption corresponds to the employer’s maximisation of
the productivity of Type 1 workers.
An employer offers (1 − λ) hours of work to a Type 1 worker, the Type
1 worker will then work the remaining λ hours or h1 efficiency hours on his
own land and produce an output g(h1). g(.) is concave and g(0) is zero. For
Type 1 workers, the consumption c is not any more equal to w as in the first
variant, because they receive a further consumption from their land. Thus,
consumption of Type 1 workers is greater than their wage. The idea is that
labour markets are for example situated in two different regions, one only
with Type 0 and the other only with Type 1 workers, so employers cannot
choose between them.
The minimisation problem of the employer for Type 1 workers is again
subject to the restriction that he produces at least y and in addition that the
workers’ consumption is at least their wage plus what they receive from their
land. The first constraint is simplified by a normalisation in the equation
below to get an easier solution (see Bliss and Stern (1978, p.336) for a detailed
explanation), the second constraint comes from the wish of the employer
to get a certain amount of productivity that can only be guaranteed with
consumption c.
min w · (1− λ) · l
subject to:
(1− λ) · h(c) · l ≥ 1
and
c ≤ (1− λ)w + g[λ · h(c)]
Minimisation leads to an equilibrium wage level:
w∗ = g′[λ · h(c)] · h(c) (6)
The wage per efficiency hour for Type 1 workers is equal to the marginal
product that the worker gets from his own land. Wages and output (or
consumption) of Type 0 workers are lower than that of Type 1 workers. The
tangent of the Type 1 worker that goes through the origin is situated on a
point at the h(c) curve to the right of the tangent of type 0 workers. The
equilibria for Type 0 and Type 1 workers are shown in Figure 2.
The employer of landless workers is facing the same minimisation problem
as in the first variant in the model. Comparing equilibrium wages in equation
5 and 6, the wage-costs of the employer who employs only landless workers
121
are higher than the wage-costs of an employer employing only workers owning
land. Thus, the employer of type 0 workers makes less profit. The comparison
between the two equilibria is further discussed in Bliss and Stern (1978)
2.1.3 Third variant of the model: landless workers and workers
with land, one labour market
The third variant is the least restricted variant among the models with de-
mand monopsony. Both types of workers (with land and without) compete
for work in the same labour market. I need two assumptions to get a result
from the model. Type 1 workers with land can generate a fixed amount
of consumption c from their land without work. c arises without work and
cannot be increased. Furthermore, the supply of type 1 workers is restricted.
The employer minimises his costs, given that at least y is produced, that
he pays a wage that is high enough to dispose of labour freely (w which is in
this case the same for both types of workers) and that there is a restricted
supply of Type 1 workers.
min w0l0 + w1l1
subject to
l0 · h(w0) + l1 · h(c + w1) ≥ 1
w0 ≥ w, w1 ≥ w, l1 ≤ l1
The result of variant three is that all Type 1 workers are employed and
only a part of the Type 0 workers. The diminution of the wage for Type 1
workers by c guarantees that both types of workers realise the same level of
consumption.
w0 = w∗
h′(w0) = h′(c + w1)
w0 = c + w1
The equilibrium can be seen in Figure 2. Type 1 workers with land are
able to work for lower wages, thus their r1 is lower than the r0 of Type 0
workers. The tangents to the capacity curves indicate the equilibrium wages
w0 and w1, the difference between the two amounts to c.
2.1.4 Competitive labour demand side
With a competitive labour demand side, the wage per efficiency unit should
be equal for all workers. Type 1 workers with land profit from the unique
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Figure 2: Wage capacity curves of two individuals, variant 3
wage level because they have a second source of consumption at their dis-
posal. They receive a higher wage per hour because of their higher produc-
tivity and can consume (again) more. All workers have the same chance to
get employed; wage differences between type 0 and type 1 workers only exist
because of productivity differences.
2.2 Dynamic Variant of Dasgupta
Dasgupta (1997) argues that a static model is not able to explain the exis-
tence of nutritional poverty traps, because the long-run effects of nutrition
are not taken into account. He also criticises the existing empirical papers on
nutritional efficiency wages, because they had taken the model too literally.
His model is based on the deterministic differential equation of a person’s
health stock (or nutrition stock for the consistence of the models)
dmt/dt = w(mt)− h(mt), (7)
m > m > m
with mt being an index of a person’s health or nutrition at time t and
h(mt) and w(mt) being a person’s food requirements and income.
w(m) and h(m) are drawn in Figure 3 so that they intersect at a person’s
health m̂.
Of the three equilibria, the one at m̂ is not stable, because once a person
moves ε away from m̂, the dynamic leads him to either the stable equilibrium
m or m, depending on the direction of the deviation from m̂.
In this model, people exist who have a health status around m̂ and thus
are almost equal in their health status, but they can then move in the opposite
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Figure 3: Dynamic model of Dasgupta
direction, dependent on the direction of the deviation from m̂.
If one discounts the future well-being of all people, which is denoted as
u(m), horizontal equity could be shown even in the presence of poverty traps.
This is the reason why Dasgupta (1997) stresses that it is necessary that all
life history be taken into account when looking at poverty traps.
As a stationary state, Dasgupta (1997) takes the energy balance condition
explained in the introduction gets the same result as the static model:
β = Φ(w − r∗)
where β is the number of tasks the person completes in each period, w is
consumption and r∗ is the maintenance expenditure plus energy expenditure
(i.e. the whole energy needed to maintain the BMI status). Φ(w−r∗) is then
the same nutrition-productivity curve as in the static models before.
2.3 Testable Hypotheses
The first obvious fact that one should see from the data is that individuals
who are worse nourished than others, have a higher propensity to be unem-
ployed. This is the prerequisite which has to hold if nutritional efficiency
wages or poverty traps exist. The problem with this descriptive observation
is that the direction of the relation is not clear. One has to adopt more so-
phisticated econometric methods to avoid the problem of endogeneity. “The
incidence of both malnutrition and involuntary unemployment need to be
endogenous. The model should identify which category of people will suffer
from unemployment, particularly it should identify those people who will be
denied access to work that pays enough to enable them to produce enough
for an employer to wish to hire them in the first place.” (Dasgupta and Ray,
1986).
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To summarise the ideas coming out of the described theories I can for-
mulate the following hypotheses.
• If there is a monopsony on the labour demand side, type 0 (landless)
workers should receive higher wages than workers owning land. In
return workers with land should be employed preferentially.
• If the demand side is competitive, the wage per efficiency hour should
be the same for all workers. But workers owning land have a further
possibility of consumption and thus they can generate a higher pro-
ductivity, a higher hourly wage and again a higher consumption. The
difference between hourly wages of landless workers and workers with
land responds to productivity differences. Both types of workers are
equally employed.
• Despite the structure of the demand side it is always true that no
employer will pay other than the efficiency wage to a landless labourer.
Theory states that there exists one and only one wage level w∗ which is
paid to type 0 workers without land. The reason is that labour supply
of type 0 workers is always abundant, in the case of a monopsony or
competition. w∗ should even be similar over regions as long as type 0
labour is abundant.
• When the relationship between productivity and consumption is greater
in the long run than in the short run, theory suggests that wages for
long-term employed should be higher than that for short-term em-
ployed. Long-term contracts should exist more often than short-term
contracts, because they are also favourable for the employers. A stable
contract means for the employee a better nourishment that leads to a
higher productivity.
• In a dynamic view, long term nutritional indicators such a height should
lead to a higher productivity and in the steady state to a higher hourly
wage.
2.4 Policy conclusions
The existence of nutritional efficiency wages gives rise to discussions about
different policy measures on how to avoid them. As one policy action, a
land reform that contains a redistribution can be carried out. Dasgupta and
Ray (1986, 1987) show with Figure 4 how a land reform influences workers
with and without land. Along the x-axis the workers are aligned with rising
amount of land. The efficiency wage w* is a horizontal line because it is
the same for all workers. w is the reservation wage for the workers which
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is too high for very poor workers to get a job and also too high for very
rich workers. The first are involuntarily unemployed, the last voluntarily.
Type 1 workers with land must cede land to type 0 workers without land.
Individuals to the left of A can generate a (higher) non-labour income and
can thus supply labour to a lower wage. Individuals to the right of B generate
a lower non-labour income after the reform, their reservation wage declines,
too. Labour supply and output will rise altogether, because more individuals
are able or willing to work. Workers without land that have also worked
before the reform will possibly be more productive ceteris paribus because
of the allocation of land. The equilibrium wage will sink so that individuals
who worked before the reform and who did not profit from the land reform
are now worse off than before the reform.
0 AA’
Land
w
B’B
w w’
w*
Figure 4: Land refom
A second policy reform can be a food program. This reform shifts point A
so that workers who could not work before, can now supply work. Reservation
wages and involuntary unemployment will fall while voluntary unemployment
of the rich workers with much land will not be changed.
3 Existing empirical work
Existing empirical investigations assume diverse directions of the correlation
of nutritional and labour market status and they also come to different con-
clusions from their estimations.
Many of the investigations aim at explaining undernutrition. As explana-
tory variables personal characteristics, the labour market status and the wage
of the individuals are used (see for example Sahn (1994) for Côte d’Ivoire or
Cigno and Rosati (1999) for India). Sahn (1994) finds in his investigation on
the contribution of income on improved nutrition that raising expenditure
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levels are a key factor to reduce chronic malnutrition of pre-school age chil-
dren. Income is not a very important factor in reducing acute malnutrition
of children. Cigno and Rosati (1999) investigate if the nutritional status of
children depends on their work status. They find that the nutritional status
of children working full time is better than of children not working. A review
on the estimations of calorie-income elasticities is done by Bouis and Haddad
(1992). They show that the relation has not been determined unequivocally
because of the different approaches of the different investigations.
Another direction of exploring the issue at hand is to explain the influence
of nutrition and health on income. I will follow this approach in my empirical
investigation. Most of the articles concentrate on the estimation of several
measures of health on wages, productivity and labour supply. As indicators
for health, morbidities, anthropometric measures and food intake are used.
Each of these indicators do have their own characteristics. Morbidities are
often self-reported and contain reporting errors. These errors can be corre-
lated with income (education) and lead to biased estimates. The property of
anthropometric measures is that, for example, the BMI varies in the short
run and BMI is correlated with maximal physical capacity independent from
energy intake. Food intake is a good indicator to measure productivity in
physically exhausting jobs. In the long run, the energy use of a body adjusts
so that energy intake does not correlate immediately with productivity. The
influence of health status on income depends on the kind of labour. Therefore
one should explain employment and health status simultaneously.
There exist several empirical papers trying to explain the relation be-
tween nutrition and income. Behrmann and Deolalikar (1989) and Strauss
and Thomas (1995) have written comprehensive surveys on the existing stud-
ies on nutritional poverty traps. I will only mention some studies that have
taken into account the most common shortcomings, as they are mentioned
by Deolalikar (1988): First, most empirical tests are made as simple correla-
tion tests without controlling for other variables; second, only average, not
marginal productivity is used as dependent variable; and third, unobserved
individual-specific effects are not taken into account.
Strauss (1986) estimates an agricultural production function with instru-
mental variables estimation using data from a rural Sierra Leone cross-section
survey of 1974-1975. The calorie availability of the family is one of the en-
dogenous variables, as is hours of family and hired labour. Instruments are
hired labour calories, several price indices, wages, household size and other
variables. The estimated output elasticity of family caloric intake amounts to
0.34 at the mean and is statistically significant. The interesting point is the
falling elasticity with rising family calorie consumption: at a very low caloric
intake (1500 calories is the mean intake of the lower third of the sample) the
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elasticity is 0.49, at the mean of the upper third at 4500 calories per day, it is
only 0.12. Deolalikar (1988) criticises Strauss (1986) in using average calorie
intake per consumer equivalent, because intra-household allocation of food
could be correlated with the used instruments as for example price indices.
Furthermore, calorie intake is described by Deolalikar (1988) as a bad proxy
for energy availability.
Deolalikar (1988) uses ICRISAT VLS data of 1976/77 and 1977/78 to con-
struct a panel of south Indian rural individuals and families. He estimates an
individual-level wage equation and a household-level farm production func-
tion. For my purpose, the equation of interest is the wage equation. The wage
equation is estimated in a semi-logarithmic form, taking as explanatory vari-
ables the average daily energy intake, the weight-for height and other com-
mon variables. The regression is made as panel regression, the author decides
for the random effects specification after using the Hausman test . The main
result is that there is no difference between the parameters for males and
females, that daily calorie intake is insignificant and that weight-for-height
as an indicator for medium-term nutritional status is significant and positive
with a wage elasticity of 0.28 in the random effects specification. The endo-
geneity problem is solved by the introduction of a panel estimation, making
the untested hypothesis that the endogeneity stems from the covariance of
the nutritional status variable with unobserved time-invariant factors.
Haddad and Bouis (1991) and Foster and Rosenzweig (2000) use a strat-
ified random panel of 448 farming households in the Philippines in the years
1984-85. Haddad and Bouis (1991) estimate a market wage function with
long run indicators of nutritional status (height), medium run (BMI) and
short run indicators (individual level calorie intake). The last two do not ef-
fect wages, but height possibly does, because it is correlated with education.
The different estimates of the elasticity of height on wages center around one
percent. Foster and Rosenzweig (2000) investigate the effect of calorie intake,
BMI and height on market wages of farm work. They estimate firstly a BMI
production function and then a wage regression with the dependent variable
being piece rate minus time wages. They find that calorie intake is more
rewarded under piece rates, while BMI is more rewarded under time wage.
Because they suspect BMI and calorie intake to be endogenous, they use
instrumental variables (owned land, household’s sex- and age-composition,
round dummies and land interacted with round variables).
A fundamental critique against using calorie availability as a measure
for productivity comes from Swamy (1997). He calculates in his paper the
calories that could be bought with different wage levels and finds that even
the lowest wages would be enough to enable the workers to buy enough
calories for their nutrition. He concludes that it can not be due to low
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wages that the workers are unemployed. I will take BMI instead of calorie
availability and argue that with BMI as the outcome of nutrition and health,
it can be accounted to the productivity of the worker, even, if the worker
could maintain a higher nutritional status with his wages.
To resume the results of the different studies, it seems to be important
to take into account the endogeneity problem and also use panel data to
account for individual-specific effects. The results of studies that investigate
the influence of BMI on wages indicate that there is a positive relationship
while studies which investigate the influence of wages on BMI indicate that
there is more or less no influence.
4 Data
My study is based on the Côte d’Ivoire Living Standard Survey (CILSS).
The survey has been conducted by the Direction de la Statistique in Côte
d’Ivoire in cooperation with the World Bank. The data set is documented
in Grootaert (1986). The Survey consists of a household, a community and
a price survey. The household survey collected information on expenditures,
income, employment, assets, basic needs and other socio-economic character-
istics of the households and the individuals living in these households. The
community survey collected data on economic and demographic character-
istics of the rural communities to which each cluster of households belongs.
The price survey collected data on prices at the nearest market to each clus-
ter.
Each round of the survey covers a period of 12 months and is accessible
from the World Bank for the years 1985-1988. The observations exist in
a rotating panel, so that in every year half of the households (and most
of the individuals living in these households) can be followed up into the
following year. The sample size is 1600 households (15000 individuals) in
each year. Thus, there are overlapping panels of 800 households each. With
this construction of the data set, it is possible to use lagged variables and thus
to take a first step in avoiding the problem of endogeneity of the relationship
between nutritional status and labour market outcomes, or to use the whole
panel of individuals to get a higher amount of observations and thus more
precise estimation results. In this case, the endogeneity problem will have to
be solved by instrumental variable estimation.
I first describe the data set I used. Variable names and their meaning are
specified in Table 8 in the Appendix, statistics of the variables can be seen
in Table 3. Variables to be explained in my later investigation are wages and
a dummy variable which indicates whether a person is employed or not.
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Table 3: Summary statistics
Wage regression Probit regression
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Lnwage 3.981 1.605
Work 0.488 0.5
BMI 21.572 2.432 21.818 2.984
BMI squared 471.257 108.447 484.916 142.88
Height 1.637 0.084 1.623 0.086
Age 45.872 14.139 40.97 16.255
Age squared 2304.079 1322.25 1942.691 1447.931
Male 0.692 0.462 0.481 0.5
Married 0.854 0.353 0.734 0.442
Nationality 0.9 0.3 0.884 0.32
Other Cities 0.013 0.113 0.256 0.436
East Forest 0.377 0.485 0.277 0.447
West Forest 0.216 0.411 0.167 0.373
Savannah 0.395 0.489 0.3 0.458
Agriculture 0.912 0.283
Ind. and Constr. 0.014 0.119
Services, Transport 0.031 0.173
Trade 0.043 0.202
Distance to doctor 29.287 21.001
Rain 124.3 36.96
Land in Hectares 8.827 8.885 6.945 12.917
Lnhhincpc 11.64 0.766 11.646 0.808
Reading skills 0.13 0.205 0.403
Math skills 0.15 0.23 0.421
year 85 0.063 0.242 0.084 0.277
year 86 0.315 0.465 0.283 0.451
year 87 0.465 0.499 0.424 0.494
year 88 0.158 0.364 0.209 0.407
N 1787 6372
The dummy variable whether a person is employed is constructed from the
wage variable. Whenever an individual stated how much wages he earned,
the variable “work” is set to one. As Table 3 shows, almost 50% of the
individuals state to get wages.
The log of hourly wages is taken from the Question: “How much money
did you get for your job?” which was posed after the question: “During the
last 7 days, have you worked for anybody who is not a household member,
for example an owner, a company, the state or another person who is not a
household member?”
The wage variable is called Lnwage and exists for all individuals who
have earned wages in their job. The problem of the wage variable is that
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individuals stated the amount of money they got from the employer and the
frequency so that I had to calculate hourly wages. Hourly wages are thus not
accurate numbers, but can only be seen as an estimate of the wages. There
is a huge variation in the wages stated in the different frequency cells, but
the aggregated numbers fit well to other studies using these data and also
to official numbers of Côte d’Ivoire (Table 7). Quite a lot of the wages are
below the minimum wage which amounts to 1431.20 per day at the time of
the interviews. The average sample wage which amounts to approx. 53.50
CFAF or 0.16 $ per hour is above the minimum wage. The approximate
wage per day would be 2,380 CFAF, taking the average 7 hours per day as
working time. But still in 1996, the minimum wage, which was only valid for
the official sector, has not been enough to live from (World Bank, 1997).
Non-labour income Lnhhincpc is calculated as the log of the weekly in-
come of the household excluding the wage of the observed individual divided
by the number of all household members.
BMI means the Body mass index of the individual. The BMI is calculated
as (weight in kilos)/(height in meters)2. To account for nonlinearities, I
include also BMI squared and Height in the regressions. Height is included
as a long-term indicator for health, which should influence productivity posi-
tively (as mentioned as important in Dasgupta (1997)). The anthropometric
measures were directly measured by the interviewer and the measurement
was repeated during the second interview after one week whenever the num-
bers were not plausible. Also some individuals with plausible results were
remeasured at random. The data taken for this investigation stem from the
first round and were completed by the data of the second round whenever
data of the second round were available and data of the first round were not
plausible.
To measure the education of the individuals only very rough measures can
be used if I want to have a consistent measure over the whole time span. More
sensitive measures were either not available for all years or the number of
observations was very small. Finally, I chose two dummies indicating whether
the individual is able to read a newspaper (Reading skills) and whether he
was able to do written calculations (Math skills).
Age is measured in years and individuals below 16 and above 65 years
were excluded from the sample, because of problems in the measurement of
the labour market status or the BMI. This results in a mean age of over 40
years in both samples.
Regional dummies were introduced to account for differences between
urban and rural areas and between areas at the seaside and landlocked areas.
Abidjan as the biggest city is excluded from the regressions. It has a unique
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position because, for example, an investigation on land availability makes no
sense in a large city. The other cities are still in my sample, because there
exist many individuals owning land. An interesting observation is that almost
26% of observations stem from other cities in the regression on the probability
to work, but only 1% of the individuals from other cities earn wages. As can
be seen, individuals in the wage regression own at an average 2 hectares more
land than individuals in the whole sample (6.9 to 8.8 hectares).
Further variables are the distance of the cluster the individual lives in to
the next doctor and the land that household has to its disposal.
Because the study includes expenditure and wage data over time, I correct
them with the Consumer Price Index of the IMF as presented in Grootaert
(1993) and displayed in Table 7. The underlying assumption when using the
CPI for the whole country is that regional price differences remain stable
over the time period considered.
The CILSS data contain price variables for the clusters. But as Grootaert
and Kanbur (1993b) demonstrate, the price index included is not appropri-
ate. The problems encountered are described in more detail in Glewwe (1990,
p.43, Appendix A). Prices in the CILSS dataset were collected for 18 food
items and 4 non-food items. As the prices of the four non-food items vary
more than could be expected (due to transportation costs), Glewwe (1990)
uses the prices of canned tomato paste as a proxy for non-food prices. The
price of canned tomato paste is the only price for a good which was “rel-
atively non-perishable and found throughout the country” (Glewwe, 1990,
p.43). Grootaert and Kanbur (1993b) argue that neither the price index of
the CILSS dataset is appropriate nor the price index of Glewwe (1990) and
they combine the CILSS price index with the data from the International
Comparisons Project. The ICP collected prices in Côte d’Ivoire in 1985 and
it contains around 20000 prices covering 912 product codes that have been
harmonised with the CILSS categories by Grootaert and Kanbur (1993b).
They arrive in a regional price index for 1985, which is prolonged over the
whole time span until 1988 by Grootaert (1993). They had to assume “that
regional price differences remained steady for the other years” (Grootaert,
1993, p.15), but they updated the expenditure shares for each year so that
the Index changes from year to year.
5 Results
Following theory, two different outcomes are expected. First, nutritional
status should influence the probability to work, because involuntary unem-
ployment exists in the model. Unemployment is due to low productivity
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levels corresponding to the undernourishment of individuals. Second, look-
ing at employed workers, nutritional status should still influence the market
by influencing productivity. Workers with better nutrition will be more pro-
ductive and will thus receive higher wages.
5.1 Instruments for BMI
Theory tells that the influence of nutrition on labour market participation
and wages is endogenous: Whenever a person is unemployed he or she will
suffer from malnutrition and thus will have a harder time to find work than
before. Thus I need instruments to account for the endogeneity problem of
BMI and BMI2. I use the distance of a doctor from the cluster the individual
lives in, the rainfall over the year in the cluster and the land in hectares the
individual has at his disposal as instruments. The doctor’s distance is a
proxy for the health status of the individual that influences wages only over
the overall nutritional measure BMI. The rainfall and the land variables are
used as instruments, because it is known from theory that land influences
productivity via the nutritional status of the individual. The reasoning is
that individuals with land are able to generate more consumption of food
(from their land) than landless workers. Rainfall influences land quality and
thus should also influence the nutritional status of the individual.
5.2 The probability to work
For a first look at the relation between nutrition and employment status, I
show descriptive probabilities to be employed in the second year of each of
the three panels dependent on employment and nutritional status in the first
year of the panel in Table 9. Looking for a relationship over time takes into
account the poverty trap reasoning of Dasgupta (1997) that it is harder for
unemployed or undernourished (or both) to find work because of their desti-
tution. Variance of the indicators is relatively high so that the differences are
not statistically significant, but the shares show nevertheless a theoretically
interesting picture.
If the sample is split into individuals who were well-nourished and un-
dernourished (BMI above or equal and below 18.5) in the first year, it can
be seen that the probability of well-nourished workers to be employed in the
second year goes from 41% in the first round to 57.1% in the third round.
Interestingly, the difference to workers who have been undernourished in the
first year is reducing over the years. While in the first round, only 23.6% of
undernourished were employed in the second year (which is half of the share
of well-nourished that found a job), almost the same share of undernourished
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as well-nourished had a job in the second year of the last round (51.3%).
Splitting the sample into individuals who were employed and those who
were unemployed in the first year leads also to highly different values. Only
between 19.5 and 27.5% of unemployed are able to get a job in the following
year, while 72.3 to 86.4% of the employed are still employed one year later.
I can further split the groups into employment and nutritional status
combined. There is not a big difference in finding a job for the unemployed
whether they are well-nourished or not. The probability to find a job for well-
nourished lies between 20 and 28%, while it is only 2 percentage points lower
for undernourished. When looking at the unemployed, the difference in the
nutritional status leads to a difference of almost 30 percentage points in the
employment probability in the second year of the first round (74% for well-
nourished vs. 46.7% for undernourished). In the last round, the probability
to find a job is almost equal at around 85% regardless of nutritional status.
It can be stated that the probability to work is always higher for well-
nourished workers relative to undernourished workers, regardless of their
labour market status in the first year, but first year employed workers will
also more likely work in the second year than in the first unemployed year.
The employment effect is even higher than the nutrition effect, finding a
first hint to the existence of long-term contracts that have been found to be
productivity-pushing in the theoretical model.
Table 4: Probability to work - Probit results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable work work BMI BMI squ.
BMI 0.124** 3.279
(2.62) (0.73)
BMI squared -0.002* -0.070
(2.26) (0.64)
Height -0.071 -1.046 -1.526* -87.876**
(0.23) (0.38) (2.42) (3.01)
Lnhhincpc 0.275** 0.181** 0.130* 5.602*
(10.46) (3.21) (2.19) (2.04)
Age 0.147** 0.129** 0.023 1.023
(18.28) (8.86) (1.56) (1.51)
Age squared -0.002** -0.001** -0.001** -0.024**
(16.95) (6.20) (3.51) (3.25)
Male 1.010** 0.992** 0.442** 18.037**
(18.42) (7.44) (4.06) (3.58)
Continued on next page...
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... table 4 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable work work BMI BMI squ.
Married 0.433** 0.398* 0.435** 19.081**
(7.84) (2.34) (4.05) (3.84)
Nationality -0.083 -0.260* 0.178 7.792
(1.26) (2.04) (1.15) (1.08)
Read Newspaper -0.072 0.084 0.053 1.873
(0.58) (0.42) (0.19) (0.15)
Math skills 0.003 -0.175 0.216 10.576
(0.03) (0.65) (0.81) (0.86)
Other Cities 0.116+ 0.632* -0.436 -18.065
(1.86) (2.40) (1.21) (1.08)
East Forest 0.101+ 0.157 0.186+ 9.946+
(1.73) (0.62) (1.67) (1.93)
West Forest -0.409** -0.503 0.555** 25.373**
(6.49) (1.52) (4.49) (4.43)
year 86 0.079 0.044 0.497** 21.285**
(1.28) (0.26) (3.28) (3.03)
year 87 0.229** 0.319** -0.032 -1.808
(3.50) (2.86) (0.21) (0.26)
year 88 0.543** 0.670** -0.295 -14.205
(7.47) (2.74) (1.58) (1.64)
Land 0.002 0.006 0.243
(1.45) (1.39) (1.16)
Rainfall 0.002+ 0.100+
(1.74) (1.66)
Distance to doctor -0.004+ -0.145
(1.79) (1.56)
Constant -8.787** -42.071 21.434** 498.824**
(10.99) (0.99) (17.19) (8.63)
N 6372 3884 3884 3884
Log-likelihood -3383.7
χ2(18) 1191
(Pseudo-)R-squared 0.2326 0.0608 0.0526
Std. errors corrected for correlation between obs. of the same individual
Column: (1) Probit, (2) Probit-IV, (3) and (4) OLS
Significance levels : + : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%
For the explanation of the probability to be employed in the sense of the
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static idea of nutritional efficiency wages with involuntary unemployment, the
whole sample has been pooled, so that for most individuals, two subsequent
observations can be used. Standard errors are corrected for the correlation
between observations of the same individual. To explain the employment
probability, a probit estimation is used. Explanatory variables in addition to
the BMI and BMI squared are personal characteristics such as age, marital
status, sex and a proxy for education, time dummies and regional dummies to
control for differences between urban and rural areas and between coast and
landlocked areas. To control for productivity differences, I further introduce
the availability of land as an additional explanatory variable. Per capita
household income of the household members other than the observed person
is used as another measure influencing productivity and thus labour market
chances. Table 4 shows the results of the pure probit estimation in column
(1), probit with instrumented BMI and BMI squared in column (2) and the
two instrumental regressions in columns (3) and (4). I only included cities
other than Abidjan and the rural regions as described in the data section.
Overall, the estimation results show the expected result, the indicators
for the goodness of the estimation show a relatively high explanatory power
of the model (with an Pseudo−R2 of 23% in the case of column (1)). Also,
many single parameters show a significant effect with the expected direction.
Looking at the influence of the body mass index, which is our most im-
portant factor of influence, it can be seen that it shows a significant impact
on the probability to be employed in the probit model, but only, when the
endogeneity problem is not taken into account. The instrumented anthro-
pometric measures loose their influence on the probability to work. Height
as a long term nutritional indicator does not show a significant influence.
From the dynamic model of poverty traps (Dasgupta, 1997), we would have
expected to find a positive sign of height on the probability to work.
Regarding the personal characteristics, men’s work probability is higher
than that of women. One further can observe, that the probability to work
increases with age with diminishing intensity and that married individuals
are also more probable to work than singles. Nationality only becomes signif-
icant in the instrumented regression in column (2) and indicates that foreign
workers work more likely than Ivorien. The educational variables Reading
and math skills do not show a significant impact in the estimations.
Regarding the regions, Savannah is the left out category. Only West
Forest shows a lower opportunity to find work, in Other Cities and East
Forest, more people work.
Finally, I introduce two variables that measure the non-wage income of
the workers: the availability of land and the per capita household income of
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the remaining household members. The land variable shows no direct effect
on the probability to work and it also is not significant in the regressions in
columns (3) and (4), which are used to calculate the instrumented variables
BMI and BMI squared. Theory suggests that workers owning land should
generate a productivity advantage from their land and should then be able
to find work more easily. This result cannot be confirmed by the estima-
tions. But, as a more general indicator of non-labour income, the log of per
capita household income shows a significant positive effect on the probability
to work and on the BMI. The positive effect on the probability to work is
a strong result, as in many studies on labour market participation, a sub-
stitution effect has been found: With a higher income of the partner, the
necessity to earn own income is reduced. My result suggests that the income
effect of labour market participation is higher than the substitution effect of
non-labour income.
As the results of Table 9 have shown a huge (though not statistically
significant) difference among the groups of undernourished and unemployed
in the different combinations, I try to find a relation between the labour
market status of today and the employment and nourishment status of the
year before. The result of the probit regression is shown in Table 5. Workt−1
is now the lagged employment status (being one if the individual was em-
ployed in the year before), BMIt−1 is the lagged BMI and Work ∗ BMIt−1
is the interaction between the two. One can see as before in Table 9, that
the most important factor explaining employment today is employment last
year. The probability to work is also higher with rising BMI, but not in any
economically important way. The joint effect is not significant. The rest of
the parameters do not show new insights into the relation between the ex-
planatories and the probability to work, so I will not discuss the parameters
further.
5.3 The wage equation
To look at the problem of efficiency wages I estimate a wage regression on
the log of hourly wages. The idea is that workers who are better nourished
are more productive and will get higher wages. Table 6 contains two wage
regressions in column (1) and (2), explaining the log hourly wages of the
individuals with most individuals being observed twice. Standard errors are
corrected for the correlation between observations of the same individual.
Column (1) shows the OLS results without respecting endogeneity of BMI
and BMI2, column (2) contains an instrumental variable estimation with
the instrument equations shown in columns (3) and (4).
As instruments, the distance of a doctor from the cluster the individual
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Table 5: Probability to work - Probit results with lag
Variable Coefficient (t-value)
Workt−1 1.311** (3.49)
BMIt−1 0.019+ (1.68)
Work ∗BMIt−1 -0.011 (0.63)
Height in meters -0.520 (1.29)
Lnhhincpc 0.204** (5.38)
Land in Hectars 0.002* (1.99)
Age 0.104** (10.45)
Age squared -0.001** (10.08)
Male 0.826** (11.45)
Married 0.325** (4.95)
Nationality -0.079 (0.89)
Read newspaper 0.049 (0.31)
Math skills -0.023 (0.15)
Other Cities -0.041 (0.52)
East Forest -0.104 (1.38)
West Forest -0.375** (4.29)
year 86 -0.433** (5.83)
year 87 -0.384** (6.42)
Constant -4.785** (5.79)
N 3196
Log-likelihood -1515.8
χ2(18) 1398.5
Pseudo-Rsqu. 0.3157
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
lives in, the rainfall over the year in the cluster and the land in hectares
the individual has at his disposal are used as before. As column (3) and
(4) show, that only rainfall and Land in Hectares do have a positive and
significant impact on BMI; rainfall has also a significant effect on BMI2.
The distance to the next doctor does not influence BMI, but it shows the
correct (negative) sign.
BMI and BMI2 only influence the earnings in the instrumented equation
and then only at the 10 percent significance level. The economic effect of
BMI shows a significant influence on wages in the IV regression. The in-
fluence of BMI on hourly wages (not in logarithms) is displayed in Figure
5 with the other explanatories set to the mean (dummies are set to zero):
Severe undernutrition leads to a wage of approximately zero that cannot be
accepted by any worker. With a rising BMI-level, the wage increases expo-
nentially. From a BMI of 22 upwards, wages fall again. This is perfectly in
line with theory which predicts high increases in productivity at a low level
and decreasing returns at a higher level of nutrition (Graph 1). Differences
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between men and women are not significant.
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Figure 5: Predicted log wages dependent on BMI level
In the description of the results of the remaining coefficients, I only rely
on the IV estimation. Height as a long run indicator of nourishment shows
a positive and significant influence on wages as expected from the theory
on poverty traps (Dasgupta, 1997). Older workers earn more than younger,
but only with an economically small effect and without diminishing returns
as in standard results. Marital status and nationality do not matter for
income. The sectors trade and services and transport pay higher wages than
the reference sector agriculture while wages in industry and construction are
not different from agricultural wages. This result is in line with standard
results on wage determinants. Other Cities, West Forest and Savanna (the
left-out category), the latter two being the more landlocked areas, which do
not include major cities, are doing worse than East Forest which includes
some major cities. The education measures were again not significant, only
in the OLS regression in column (1) reading skills are positive as could be
expected.
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Table 6: Determinants of Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable lnwage lnwage BMI BMI squ.
Lnhhincpc 0.594** 0.556** 0.022 1.436
(9.42) (4.66) (0.26) (0.38)
BMI 0.030 12.890+
(0.33) (1.66)
BMI squared -0.000 -0.289+
(0.00) (1.67)
Height 0.730 3.617* -0.148 1.723
(1.09) (2.06) (0.17) (0.04)
Age 0.042* 0.100* -0.006 -0.138
(2.47) (2.38) (0.25) (0.13)
Age squared -0.000* -0.001 -0.000 -0.010
(2.31) (1.50) (0.86) (0.86)
Male 1.319** 0.056 0.590** 21.599**
(10.67) (0.07) (3.64) (2.95)
Married 0.264* 0.214 0.187 8.055
(2.18) (0.79) (1.09) (1.04)
Nationality 0.336* 0.480 0.253 12.283
(2.44) (1.27) (1.24) (1.33)
Reading skills 0.585* -0.051 -0.487 -21.435
(2.44) (0.11) (1.24) (1.20)
Math skills -0.164 0.230 0.437 19.659
(0.77) (0.53) (1.17) (1.16)
Other Cities 0.213 0.321 -0.811+ -37.896+
(1.45) (0.36) (1.72) (1.78)
East Forest 0.250** 0.414+ 0.185 8.865
(2.60) (1.90) (1.22) (1.30)
West Forest 0.302** 0.512+ 0.559** 24.972**
(3.05) (1.70) (3.08) (3.04)
Ind. and Constr. 0.403 1.252 -0.494 -14.920
(1.33) (0.74) (0.94) (0.63)
Services, Transport 1.575** 3.883* 1.766** 85.669**
(7.16) (2.41) (5.41) (5.80)
Trade 1.734** 2.514** 1.136** 53.147**
(9.85) (3.38) (4.15) (4.29)
year 86 0.670** 30.377**
(2.86) (2.86)
year 87 -0.051 -2.008
(0.22) (0.19)
Continued on next page...
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... table 6 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable lnwage lnwage BMI BMI squ.
year 88 -0.294 -12.418
(1.07) (1.00)
Rainfall 0.005** 0.246**
(2.84) (2.89)
Land in Hectares 0.010+ 0.425
(1.72) (1.57)
Distance to doctor -0.003 -0.149
(1.19) (1.17)
Constant -7.404** -154.381+ 20.567** 403.011**
(4.33) (1.74) (11.57) (5.02)
N 3033 1787 1787 1787
R2 0.27 0.09 0.09
F 33.76 7.16 8.37 8.10
Reference categories: year 85, Savannah, not married, female, foreign, agriculture
Std. errors corrected for correlation between obs. of the same individual
Column: (1), (3) and (4) OLS, (2) IV
Significance levels: + : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%
What can be done to improve the status of undernourished individuals
in Côte d’Ivoire? The policy to distribute land to the poorest to help them
increase their productivity in the labour market was mentioned at the end of
the theory chapter. Being the correct measure when looking at the theory,
I cannot fully agree on basis of the regression results. Non-wage income
in general influences BMI and also the labour market indicators directly,
but the indirect influence on the labour market outcome over BMI is weak.
With the results at hand, anthropometric measures seem to matter more in
determining the productivity of a worker, once he found a job, less in helping
him to find employment.
6 Conclusions
The aim of the paper was to find nutritional efficiency wages and a poverty
trap in a country of Sub-saharan Africa - Côte d’Ivoire. While Côte d’Ivoire
is relatively rich in comparison to its neighbours, poverty is still very high.
During the period under consideration from 1985 to 1988, government spend-
ing was cut down and the prices in the agricultural sector rose. Adjustments
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were further undertaken to save money in the public sector: Wages of em-
ployees were frozen so that they decreased with inflation and many workers
were laid off. But looking at the probit results with lagged explanatories,
unemployment is one of the worst things that can happen to a worker. Once
a worker is laid off it is very hard for him to get into a new job. The worsen-
ing labour market situation of the unemployed comes about because of the
destitution of the workers that cannot buy enough food. With respect to the
model, all the mentioned actions undertaken by the government to enhance
growth and lower poverty are not helpful to generate workers who are able
to help themselves out of poverty.
Regarding the policy question on how to achieve the goal to reduce
poverty and hunger as formulated in the International Development Goals,
the answer from my regression is that ex ante well-nourished workers do have
an advantage in their wage negotiations, but they do not have an advantage
in finding a job. Finding a job and increasing wages are both achieved best if
the non-labour income of the individual is increased. The ownership of land
does not per se help to increase the BMI, so a land reform as explained in the
theory would only help to improve the situation of the landless if non-labour
income can be effectively increased.
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7 Appendix
Table 7: Macro Data for Côte d’Ivoire
1985 1986 1987 1988
HH cons. exp., billions of CFA Francs 1836.4 2007.8 2041 1971.1
Ch. in cons. prices 1.86 9.68 6.94 6.93
Exports of Goods and Services 1466.3 1252.7 1013.5 788.7
GDP 3137 3244 3118 3067
Pop. in mill. 10.46 10.88 11.29 11.7
GDP per capita 299.90 298.16 276.17 262.14
Exchange Rate 449.3 346.3 300.5 297.9
GDP Growth 4.9 3.4 -1.6 -2
Cons. Growth 4.1 13.1 -7.1 -16.6
Source: IMF, World Bank (1997); Grootaert (1993)
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